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CHILDREN'S LIVES, INDONESIANS' LIVES,
AND GENERIC LIABILITY
PETER

A. BELL*

Dear Lauren and Natalie',
I begin this letter riding in a product-in this case, one made by
the creme de la creme of product manufacturers: Mercedes-Benz. I
am in a stunning traffic jam, somewhere in Central Java, Indonesia, on
the overnight bus from Salatiga to Jakarta. 2 I was wondering, as we
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. I write this while a visiting professor at Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, in Salatiga, Indonesia, for the 1995-1996 academic
year, thanks to sabbatical leave support from Syracuse University. I write it imbued with the
memory of my friend, Peter A. Sandwall, who died suddenly this past year. Peter helped teach
me, among other things, the importance of looking at the impacts of adult actions and decisions
from the viewpoints of children.
1. Lauren and Natalie Rogers-Bell, 12 and 6 years old respectively at this writing, are two
extraordinarily wonderful children whom it is my joy to parent. I write this Article in the form
of a letter to them for several reasons. First, my time this year in Indonesia has reminded me
that friends---even legal academic friends-enjoy reading my letters much more than anyone
seems to have enjoyed reading my law review articles. I thought, therefore, that if I forced
myself to draft this Article in letter form, I might write in a fashion more agreeable to you who
happen upon this piece. Second, by writing this as a letter to my children, I hope to remind
myself to focus my attention more fully on the future and on the more vulnerable in our society
when I write about tort law herein. I need that reminder because I, like most persons involved
in policymaking processes, focus most easily on the most immediate situations and policy effects.
Also, like most persons involved in tort debates these days, I hear most loudly and frequently
the voices of tort law's "reformers," the companies and professionals who disproportionately
consist of society's wealthier and more powerful members.
Third, I expect that writing this to my children will enhance my efforts to focus on the
realities of the relationships between products liability law and the lives of people in the United
States and other parts of the world. By trying to understand what rules about generic liability
will probably mean for the people and situations closest to me as I think and write, I hope to
make a contribution to consideration of the issues involved which does not tread the same
ground in the same way as the fine work of others who have focused on this subject, such as the
editor for this Symposium, its other contributors, and those who have worked so thoughtfully on
the drafts of the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Products
Liability.
Fourth, focusing on my children's lives in this writing should increase the chances that my
prescriptions for products liability law laid out herein will coincide with the consumer sovereignty norm's prescriptions, namely that the law be that which competent, informed consumers
most would prefer. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
Finally, by writing to my children, the quality of whose lives seems more important to me
than the quality of my own, I expect I will bring as much intellectual rigor and honesty to my
thinking and writing about generic liability as I can muster.
2. Mentioning my "extraordinarily wonderful" children in the preceding note, I
remembered that a parent often has a view of the world that is very skewed, insofar as it involves
his or her children. While most people find my children agreeable, in truth probably only my
wife and I find them "extraordinarily. wonderful." I think some call this "being perspectived."
Anyway, being aware of how our perspectives influence our understanding of the world, as
well as of particular children, I think that my understanding of products liability law might be
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passengers sit here going about thirty meters a minute, with a stream
of gaudy buses passing us on the rocky, inclined shoulder of this road,
whether Mercedes should be liable if, built as superbly as I expect this
bus is, a court concluded that it in some way was unreasonably dangerous, and that its unreasonably dangerous characteristic caused
someone's injury.
I was wondering this because a law professor I know asked me
several months ago to think about one of the issues in product liability
law, one called generic liability. Since I had never before focused particularly on that issue-the question of whether a company could
properly be held liable for harm caused by its product just because the
product was more dangerous than it was useful 3-I hoped that thinking and reading about it a lot, with you two and our Indonesian setting
firmly in mind, would help me reach a sensible conclusion.
I was wondering about this generic liability issue in relation to
Mercedes, because it seems to me that one of the reasons many people are hostile to tort law in the United States these days is that they
suspect that loony juries will sock companies with big products liability damage awards no matter how good their products are. 4 For peoricher and that I might broaden the thinking offered in this Symposium if I focus on the questions at hand from a view of what their resolution might mean in Indonesia, where I live and
work with my family this year. Notwithstanding the opening paragraphs of this Article, which
were in fact drafted during my bus trip, it was not entirely written on one bus journey.
Because I write this from the small city of Salatiga, in Central Java, where my access to the
writings of others about products liability is severely curtailed, I will not be able to attribute
ideas as fully to others nor reference readers to other works as I would if writing in the United
States. To those scholars whose writings have influenced my thinking about tort law over the
past 18 years, and who do not find themselves cited herein, I offer my apologies.
3. This issue has been referred to as one of "generic" liability, see Carl T. Bogus, War on
the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1995), or
"product category" liability; see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263 (1991). At the heart of the issue is the question whether injured users or consumers can
recover damages in a products liability lawsuit if they prove that a product's social utility is
outweighed by the product's social costs (i.e., risks of harm). Some scholars claim that a court
should impose liability for the way a product is deliberately made only when it has evidence of a
safer way of making the product. See id. Others would permit a court to hold a product-maker
liable in such situations if it decides the product's risks outweigh its utility, regardless of whether
there is a safer way to make the product. See, e.g., Bogus, supra. This Article will focus only on
products which might fail a risk-utility balancing test. It will not deal with other possible bases
for generic liability, such as abnormal danger, political disdain, or ease of implementation, which
some authors have suggested. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra, at 1307.
4. See, e.g., Robert M. Hayden, The CulturalLogic of A PoliticalCrisis: Common Sense,
Hegemony and the GreatAmerican Liability Insurance Famineof 1986, 11 STUD. IN LAW, POL &
Soc'Y 95, 99-100 (1991) (offering anthropological and political explanation for such attitudes).
Based on my contacts with corporate officers and their lawyers at a couple of conferences and on
the statements from such officers and lawyers which I have read or have read about, I understand corporate officers to share that belief to a considerable extent.
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pie of my baby-boom generation, the Mercedes brand name is
synonymous with quality and safety (and high price). Often, authors
who turn their attention to generic liability do so in the context of
products which lots of "university" types, like me, think are "bad"
products. These include products such as handguns, cigarettes, and
asbestos. That should not surprise anyone. Tort litigation in which a
plaintiff seriously claims, or a court seriously considers, that an injurycausing product by its very nature poses greater risks than benefits to
society rarely occurs with respect to any but the most nasty products.
I, for example, would be quite cheerful if handguns, cigarettes, and
asbestos disappeared from markets everywhere tomorrow. However,
since a lot of people pay considerable sums of their hard-earned
money for those products, I am confident that many do not share my
aversion to these products.
Concerned that my personal distaste for these products-because
of their danger to you and me and their failure to amuse me in any
way-may influence my judgments about the broader generic liability
issue, I will try also to focus my thinking in this letter on products
which I do appreciate, but which might become subject to generic liability claims. Mercedes buses, cars, and trucks seem too close to the
head of their class to be threatened seriously by generic liability.5 So,
let's try to keep in mind, as we read and write this, ice cream. All of
us love ice cream, perhaps even more so this year, since it is available
in such limited forms in our part of Indonesia. 6 Schooled as I am in
tort litigation about the hazards of toxic substances, I can imagine litigation in which a person were able to prove that probably her 7 physical disabilities were primarily caused by her regular ingestion of the
fats, cholestrol, and chemical additives inherent in ice cream. 8 This
5. A considerable part of the sizeable body of motor vehicle products liability litigation in
the United States consists of design defect cases, which rely on risk-utility balancing standards.
See RESTATEMENT (T-muD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 2 cmt. c, Reporters' Note at 50-73
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). Therefore, a focus on motor vehicle products herein might confuse the generic liability issue.
6. In the area in Central Java where we live this year, ice cream is readily available only in
the packaged cones and ice-creams-on-a-stick which many stores and roving vendors sell from
small freezers. While some markets carry ice cream one-liter containers, in very limited flavors,
the tiny size of our refrigerator freezer makes purchasing ice cream in larger quantities impractical. At home in the United States, it is common for our family to have four or more half-gallons
of ice cream in our refrigerator freezer at any one time. There, in the words of the Coneheads,
we consume "mass quantities."
7. Since I am writing to my daughters, concerned primarily about potential harms to them,
I will refer to tort plaintiffs generally as though they were female. All such references would be
equally applicable to someone's sons.
8. In discussing ice cream in this letter/article, I am referring only to that which shows up
in stores and vendors' carts as "ice cream." I invite the reader to assume with me that there is no
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focus should help me think better about how willing we should be to
have some player(s) in the legal system-judge or jury-conclude that
the risks of a product we really like outweigh its utility to us and
others who have long consumed it aware that it was not good for us.
Keeping ice cream in mind should help me be more sure that my appreciation of tort's strengths 9 does not blind me to the hazards generic
liability might pose to products that will enhance your lives.
Even with my focus on ice cream, and the notion that some group
of knuckleheads-for that, surely, is what I would then call them-on
a jury or appellate court could label its societal risks greater than its
benefits, I believe that courts should be able to impose generic liability. That could mean the disappearance of ice cream from our table. 10
If it does, I will join you in whatever anger rituals we think appropriate. And, I will still believe that a proper" court should be able to
make a manufacturer-including, obviously, an ice cream manufacturer-pay for the injuries caused by its product's unreasonably dangerous characteristics.
"That's nice, Dad," I suspect you might be thinking, "but why
write to us about this?" Well, I explained some of the reasons in an
earlier footnote. 12 I also want this letter/article to offer other readers
some insight into consumer preferences by focussing on us as consumers. Many modern tort theorists have concluded that products liability
law should mirror the risk allocation agreements consumers would
make, if they feasibly could, with producers of the products they buy,

readily available substitute, with less of ice cream's dangerous fat and cholestrol characteristics,

along the lines of the "light" and "fat-free" versions of ice cream which are common in the
United States. That assumption will assist me to think about the possible generic liability of a
product my family finds very attractive. It is not a completely unrealistic assumption, given that
the only ice cream available to us in Indonesia is that old-time "real" fat-filled ice cream and
given that I do not generally find reduced-fat varieties of ice cream or frozen yogurt to be ac-

ceptable substitutes for "real" ice cream.
9. For writings which indicate my appreciation of tort law's strengths, see Peter A. Bell,
Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neo-Contract,74 MINN. L. REV. 1177 (1990); Peter
A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333
(1984) [hereinafter Bell, Bell Tolls].
10. Don't worry, I don't think it will mean that, as I explain later.
11. As you will see later in this Article, I want to hedge my bets in allowing courts to do in

ice cream. In turning important power over to a court, I get nervous that the court will be one of
those rare weird ones that think bizarrely about the product at risk. That's one of the advantages of writing as though generic liability were a threat to a product I really like. As a result, I
will suggest that the composition of the court which can decide a question of generic liability be
determined by special procedures which reduce to tiny the chance of a bizarre decision about the
relative risks and utility of the product in question. See infra Part II.A.

12. See supra note 1.
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with respect to product-related injuries. 13 In other words, the law
should see to it that people get what they really want when they buy
products, as much as possible. By focusing on your lives-and, to a
lesser extent, those of our friends here in Indonesia-and what kinds
of legal protections against product-related injuries I want you to have
at what costs, I hope to give readers, including law makers, a firmer
feel for the preferences of rational consumers in this regard. 14 I am
also writing to you because, having found blissful the extensive close
contact we have here in Salatiga, I want to include you more in my
work.
Because this letter is appearing in a law review, I will explain the
reasons why I reach the conclusion in favor of generic liability in a
series of sections, to which I will affix headings that I hope will help
your and others' understandings of what I am saying. I will first talk
about what I think is most important for your future lives, and for
those of our Indonesian friends, related to the kinds of risks with
which tort rules deal. Then, we will play. I will paint a section with
you: a picture of generic liability in its social operations as a fairy godmother might have created it-the "Cinderella-at-the-ball" picture of
generic liability, with "life happily ever after" consisting of the lives
which I have described in Section I. Following that, we will visit,
bringing along our Cinderella picture, the Cave of the Henderson and
Twerski. 15 There we will see the elaborately drawn cave paintings of
13. See, e.g., George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97

YALE L.J. 353 (1988). For a useful recent summary of this scholarship, see Steven P. Croley &
Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for EnterpriseLiability, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 683, 713-35 (1993).

14. I expect readers to obtain that "firmer feel" by hearing the expression of my carefully
thought out preferences as a consumer, primarily the preferences which I have for my children,
but also those which I have for myself. I recognize that "ask Peter Bell" would not be the

methodology chosen by most legal scholars to locate consumer choice about products liability
law. Nevertheless, given the imperfections inherent in the models scholars use to make guesses
about what informed consumers would prefer, see Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 713, the

expressed and carefully explained preferences of this informed consumer may assist others in
ascertaining what competent informed consumers in general would want. If I lay my preferences
out clearly enough in this Article and can explain clearly why I have those preferences, you, the
reader, can judge for yourself the typicality of what I want in safety from product makers.
15. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, law professors at Cornell University and
Brooklyn Law School, respectively, are the Reporters for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. They are also the foremost academic critics of the idea
of generic liability, both in scholarly writing and in their work producing the Drafts of the new
Restatement. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3. By referring to the "Cave of the Hender-

son and TWerski," I mean to evoke the dark and monstrous image they offer of generic liability,
much the kind of image which authors of stories for young people evoke with cave-dwelling

monsters. I know Professor Henderson personally, due in large measure to the proximity of our
workplaces. He is an unusually warm, considerate, and reflective man, who resembles in no way
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generic liability as an Ugly Stepsister. In the face of uncertainty about
with whom and what we are dealing when we confront generic liability, we will take the glass slipper of Section I-the detailed discussion
of what we want from products liability law-and, in classic fairytale
tradition, see if it fits the generic liability foot.
All of this "play" is quite serious. Back in America, a group
called the American Law Institute ("ALI")-sort of a "royal family"
of tort lawmaking-is on the verge of proposing new rules about generic liability. 16 A major debate rages among "contractarians," "regulators," and tort adherents about the merits of any form of products
liability. 17 Here in Indonesia, asbestos and tobacco products, as well
as a multitude of dangerous vehicles, can be found almost everywhere,

contributing to an accident carnage that would appall American society and which has led to calls for drastic action. 18 If decisions about
the existence or shape of generic liability law can have any significant' 9 impact-positive or negative-on the lives of you and others,
now seems the time to deal with them.
I.

WHAT I WANT FROM TORT LAW FOR You
(AND OUR INDONESIAN FRIENDS)

Before I focus directly on generic liability, it seems to me that I
should talk to you about what I want, for you and for our Indonesian
friends, 20 from products liability law. When I teach law, I begin most
my images of a cave-dwelling monster. While I seem destined to disagree with him about many
issues in tort law, I can only aspire to Professor Henderson's personal and professional excellence. I have met Professor Twerski, but only briefly. I have no reason to think him monstrous
either.
16. The American Law Institute (ALI) proposed in 1991 a project to write a new Products
Liability Restatment as a part of a Restatement of the Law (Third) of Torts. Professors Henderson and Twerski, the project's Reporters, have produced two full Tentative Drafts of the Restatement, the most recent of which, Tentative Draft No. 2 (March 13, 1995) is referred to in this
Article. This Draft expressly addresses the issue of generic (product-category) liability.
17. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 713-66, for a summary of the debate.
18. See, e.g., Editorial, The Ramayana Inferno, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 4 (commenting on a recent spate of multi-victim accidents in Java, calling for "real action" to remedy "a
seeming indifference to safety"). The Jakarta Post is Indonesia's national English-language
newspaper.
19. I do not propose in this article/letter to delve deeply into the significance of the decision
for or against generic liability. Because such a decision could affect several industries dramatically, it is quite important to some product sectors. Because the generic liability issue will never
be raised to a court for the overwhelming majority of products, the decision for or against it will
have limited significance in the products liability world in general.
20. I thought about talking about what Indonesians in general might seek from tort law,
given that my conclusions about products liability rules would affect all Indonesians were they
miraculously to become law here. I felt, however, that it would be more consistent with the tone
of this Article and with the method I am using to try to force myself to think thoroughly and
concretely about generic liability issues if I think and talk about our Indonesian friends. Those
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of my courses by asking my students to focus on the goals they think
important in the area of law we are to study. If they and I can think
well about what we realistically want from any piece of law, then we
can work backwards to try to determine what particular legal rules
will get us most of what we think we and others should have. Interestingly (to me), what I sense to be the main stream of recent products
liability scholarship seems to encourage that approach. Those writers
stress that the law should reflect how people really want legal liability
21
for product injuries to be ordered.
These scholars also seem to tell me that I would want most of all
autonomy from products liability rules. In this context, autonomy for
me and you and our friends means that the law delivers what we
would agree to have it deliver, if we could make such agreements with
product distributors. It's sort of like a pizza: if we are going to pay for
and get a pizza, we certainly would value most delivery of the pizza we
want.22
While the prominence of autonomy seems intellectually "right" in
thinking about products liability law, my thoughts more instinctively,
and powerfully, turn to other possible "goods" which the law might
provide. When I am asked, "what pizza do you want?", I do not instinctively respond, "the one I choose. ' 23 From products liability
law-including its rules about generic liability-I want, above all else,
friends include children, university faculty and students, dokkar (horse-pulled carriage) drivers,
basketball and tennis coaches and players, schoolteachers, artists, household assistants, young
ministers, and neighbors. They do not include many of the least well-off in Indonesian society,
although they surely include people who are below average in their financial well-being.
21. This "main" stream of recent scholarship wants products liability law to consist of what
people would agree to with product distributors about the risks of product-related injuries were
they able to settle the terms of the agreements without cost. The law, in other words, should
reflect the preferences of competent and informed consumers regarding risk allocation. See, e.g.,
Croley & Hansen, supra note 13, at 713; Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60
FoiDH"~s L. REV. 819 (1992).
22. Of course, not everyone would be so thrilled to receive the double-cheese, peppers, and
pepperoni pizza that we like. Law, being a social good, must be delivered the same to all (with
some possibilities for individualization which will be discussed below in Section IV, when we
examine the possibilities I suggest for the use of disclaimers of liability). Products liability theorists, therefore, speak about a collective autonomy which exists in the same quasi-theoretical,
quasi-empirical sense as the "popular will." Nevertheless, the principles they advance lead me to
emphasize autonomy as a first desire for us all with respect to law.
23. I recognize that this "instinctive" response with respect to pizzas is heavily influenced
by my experiences since childhood. I have all that time been able to choose the kind of pizza I,
or my group, wanted. Having taught in China in 1987-1988, I recognize that there are people
who have grown up with little choice-even about what they get to eat. When asked "what kind
of pizza do you want?", such persons might more instinctively respond, "the one I want." The
mainstream legal scholars I describe in the text quite probably feel they have grown up with a
(tort) law dictated by others without attention-or at least without sufficient attention-to what
the law's consumers want. Regardless of differences in our initial instinctive responses, these
scholars and I probably get to the same place when we order pizza. I suspect we get to the same
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safety for you. Then, safety for others. I also want the law about risks
and injuries-which is what tort law is-to provide you more, rather
than less, control over your own lives. While I would prefer that tort
rules enhance your financial security and opportunity and your sense
of justice, I don't really count on tort law for much of that. Somewhere mixed in throughout, I want the law to provide those things to
all of us at an acceptable price-just as for the pizza.
A.

Safety, Above All Else

I begin by discussing my desire for safety, rather than autonomy,
because it is clear to me once I start thinking about accidents that this
is my preeminent concern for you. When we talk about products liability law, we are talking about products which pose some risks of danger to you. Speaking of generic liability means talking about products
24
that are particularly risky to you and others.
I want you to be safe. I would like others, especially our friends,
to be safe, too. For you, however, I want that safety with a passion as
strong as any I have or have had. More than anything I can think of, I
want you safe, safe from serious injury or death.25 Let's knock this
deep into the reader's consciousness: I WANT MY CHILDREN
SAFE! I think most people have that as a rock-solid top priority with
respect to those they love and risky products.
"How safe?" I love that question. I use it all the time with my
students in a tort or environmental law course, particularly the selfplace-ordering the products liability law that we want-in our analysis of generic liability as
well.
24. No sensible plaintiff's lawyer, nor any court, will raise or deal with the idea that a product maker should be liable for the dangers inherent in the very nature of its product unless that
product poses considerable risks of harm. For ice cream-one of our foci in this letter/articlethe inherent risks of harm to consumers would have to be extremely high in order to offset its
yumminess.
25. I state this "want" strongly. I could spend pages trying to explain and illustrate it. I do
not do so because I believe that my feelings of love and concern for my children are similar to
those of most parents-in the United States, in Indonesia, or elsewhere-and, therefore, my
safety concerns for them do not need explaining to you, the reader. I imagine that the overwhelming percentage of parents, worldwide, would give the same answers I would to priorityexploring questions such as: "Would you rather have great wealth or have your children free
from serious injury or death?"; or, "Would you rather have deep and satisfying adult loves and
friendships or have your children free from serious injury or death?"; or, "Would you rather
have tremendous achievements in your life or have your children free from serious injury or
death?" If asked to elaborate on such questions, I would probably define "serious injury" as
injury which would be physically or psychologically crippling in a significant fashion for longer
than some substantial period of time, such as a year.
In stating this core passion, I mean to imply that it is widely shared, throughout the world.
Therefore, for the law to satisfy this "want" would satisfy the consumer sovereignty norm referred to above. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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righteous ones who, like me, start from a "human-life-is-sacred"
orientation.
"How safe do I want you to be?" I hate that question. I don't
know the answer. I certainly don't know the answer in general. I
have a little bit better idea of the answer in particular situations. I will
let you, Lauren, cross busy Jalan Diponegoro by yourself, but won't
let Natalie, because it is too unsafe. I will let you, Lauren, go shopping in downtown Salatiga with your friend, Claire, but I won't let you
two go on your own with Claire to Yogyakarta, the big city nearly
three hours from here by public bus. Too unsafe. I won't let either of
you ride a bike around this small city, even if the Davis and Fosdahl
kids, who are your ages, can.
These touching expressions of concern and confusion, common to
all parents, probably are not helping Professors Henderson and Twerski figure out what to do about generic liability law as they work on
the latest drafts of the new Restatement. So, let me try to say something relevant in response to that key question: "How safe?" While I
am not sure how safe I want products to be which may have an impact
on your lives, I am confident that I want you to be safer in that regard
than other people do. I can accept, albeit somewhat grudgingly, the
behavior of other children in exposing themselve to dangers in situations in which I would not accept such behavior from you. So, too, I
can accept risks that other people's behavior poses to those children
where I would not accept that (or at least would oppose it more
strongly) were the risks of harm to you. 26
This has the following implication for products liability law: If a
court or jury, in a decision that is acceptable to reviewing authorities,
were to determine that the risks of a particular product were greater
26. I do not mean to suggest by these statements that I am more risk-averse than other
people. Despite my greater-than-average awareness of risk-seemingly an occupational hazard
(so to speak) for a torts teacher who reads regularly about risks which come to fruition-I understand myself overall as either risk-neutral or slightly on the side of risk-preferring, given my
age. That perception found some confirmation in the reactions of many friends and acquaintances to your mom's and my decision to come (and bring you) to Indonesia for a year, particularly after we informed them of all the immunizations we thought it wise to obtain before we
came.
Rather, by these statements I mean to emphasize that, whatever my level of risk tolerance,
it is lower for you than for other people's children. I can tolerate a risk for Martin Schaefer,
your six-year-old playmate, Natalie, that I would not accept for you. I expect that is a common
phenomenon. Martin's parents, I assume, would allow you to engage in even riskier behavior
than they allow Martin (if they thought that our wish) even though they give him a freer risk rein
than I would give you. Probably, all that I am reminding readers of here is the tendency of

parents to worry most about their own children. Economists would understand this as the rational tendency of persons to demand less chance of a result as the gravity of its harm increases.
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than its benefit to society, then I would believe that product too unsafe for you.
"Even ice cream, Dad?" "After all," you and others might well
argue, "judges and juries surely can come up with estimates of a product's dangers or its advantages that differ from yours. They certainly
would arrive at a different sense with respect to the benefits and risks
involved in living in Indonesia for a year."
"True, but.. ." would be my answer. It is extremely unlikely that
there would be such a judicial decision in the area of generic liability-at least not one which would provide us with more safety than I
want. Under the basic legal doctrines of products liability, which I do
not contest here, there will be a legal decision for generic liability only
where the court concludes, with respect to a product which could not
be made more safely and still retain its essential character, that the
27
product's risks to the population at large outweigh its social value.
That kind of risk-benefit calculus is one with which I would be very
surprised to disagree in terms of the safety I want for you. These sorts
of familiar products come into a courtroom with a strong presumption
of legitimacy because of their widespread legal use. In addition, they
will be assured of receiving a strong defense, 28 which is likely to do an
optimal job of presenting to the decisionmaker a rosy picture of the
product's "great" social benefits and its "really-not-so-big" social
costs. Under these circumstances, it is extremely unlikely that I would
27. See RESTATMENT (TtnRD) oF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt c., Reporters' Note
at 50-88 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (collecting cases and scholarly commentary establishing
risk-utility balancing as the dominant test for product defect outside the manufacturing defect
area). I refer to "judicial" or "court" decisions about the risk-utility balance because I propose
in this article/letter that generic liability issues be decided by a three-judge court, without a jury.
See infra Part II.A.
28. A product attacked on grounds of generic liability is bound to receive a thorough, competent defense because the threat to the entire product line which such a liability judgment poses
gives the product's distributors a very strong incentive to invest considerable resources in
preventing a court determination of liabiity. The liberal intervention rules which I propose for
the court which will decide generic liability questions in Part II.A., infra, should guarantee that
affected manufacturers or other distributors will have a full opportunity to present their best
defense. In fact, the much greater concern for the adequacy of risk-utility balancing decisions
would be that the plaintiff's side of the evidence will be slighted. After all, the plaintiff determines whether a claim of generic liability will be raised in a case. Yet, she most likely has only a
one-shot interest in the determination and thus has much less at stake financially than the defense. Moreover, plaintiffs' tort lawyers often come from small offices, which may not have the
financial wherewithal to conduct the expensive investigation or produce the sorts of knowledgeable witnesses which would be optimal from the side of those subject to the product's risks. Yet,
in any case, a plaintiff's lawyer may feel ethically obligated to raise a generic liability claim on
her client's behalf, even if she does not feel she has adequate resources to present an optimal, or
even very strong, case. These factors suggest that a plaintiff is far more likely to underinvest in
evidence production and presentation, at least compared to the resources the defense will be
likely to invest.
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disagree with a court's decision that the product under review was too
unsafe, particularly with its effects upon you in mind.
You might further raise the question as to whether I am overemphasizing safety for you. A recent interaction makes me think not.
As you know, I partly tore my Achilles tendon near the end of the
rainy season here in Indonesia. Now you all know that as someone
who reads a lot about medical malpractice, I am very "careful"-some
might say "nervous"-in dealing with health care providers. My ordinary level of concern was highlighted when, a week after being placed
in a half-cast by Dr. Timotius, 29 my leg went through a five-day period
of swelling, pain and considerable bruise-like discoloration. My concerns manifested themselves in a conversation I had with one of my
Satya Wacana University law students, who accompanied me on my
return visit to Dr. Timotius, to serve as a translator. The student,
Arifin, had just returned from a semester in the United States at Beloit College.
On our way to the doctor's office, I was telling Arifin about how
careful I am in using doctors in the United States, and about how nervous I was making use of Indonesian health care professionals when I
could neither communicate directly with most nor had any substantial
sense of the background or reputation in the medical community of
the doctors whom I visited. Arifin nodded sagely and asked: "You
feel better in America because you can sue the doctor if there is
malpractice?"
I reacted immediately and strongly, emphasizing that the possibility I could get money if I were mistreated had absolutely no part in my
thinking. I wanted to be safe, to avoid injury, I told Arifin forcefully.
I had no concern about being able to sue someone if in fact my leg
stayed bad or got worse because the doctor mistreated me. 30 The fact
that this has been my only concern in thinking about my own medical
treatment suggests to me that I am not overemphasizing safety for the
two of you.
29. A doctor in a nearby town, recommended to me by an expatriate friend as a foreigntrained doctor with some specialization in "bone" cases. Dr. Timotius spoke some, albeit little,

English with me. I neither speak nor understand Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) beyond the most rudimentary level.
30. That is not to say that if I were a victim of malpractice I would not then want to have
some legal recourse against the wrongdoer. From my (relatively) unmangled perspective, money
simply could not make up for any kind of serious injury. Even were I to be the victim of someone's misfeasance, I would be quite reluctant-knowing the tort system pretty well-to become
involved in a lawsuit to any significant extent. Tort lawsuits appear to me to be pretty unpleasant activities, for all concerned.
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B. Autonomy
While wanting safety for you, I do not want to ignore what you
want for yourselves and what others want for themselves. The strand
of legal/political scholarship which emphasizes that the imposed rules
which govern people's lives should reflect as much as possible the
choices people would make for themselves if they had the chance is
both long and impressive. 31 One of the leading modern legal philosophers, John Rawls, thought the appropriate starting point for a just
legal system to be the choices people would make with respect to law
if they were creating a society from behind a veil of ignorance which
would not allow them to see the particular positions they themselves
would occupy in the society.3 2 If you got to choose the legal rules that
govern products liability, you could order up from the tort system
whatever it had that you really wanted in the way of safety, wealth,
justice, or insurance.
I know already that you two girls like to make your own decisions
about matters that affect your lives. I believe that your strong wills
increasingly will lead you to assert your "right" to make your own
decisions as you move into your teenage years, and accede less willingly to our maternalism and paternalism. Even if I could, I would not
withhold from you the same right to lead your own lives that I treasure for myself. I hope you will do even better with your choices than
I have.
I am not quite so enthusiastic about having legal rules, at least in
the area of products liability, that reflect the choices you would make
if you were able to bargain directly with a product provider whose
product created a risk of harm to you. I say that knowing how attractive it would be to me to have such legal rules coincide with the
choices I would make in such a bargaining situation. I want the legal
rules to be those which would best provide you what will be important
to your lives, and I fear that you might chose wrongly.
Am I being hypocritical? Real choice for me but constricted
choice for you? Well, yes and no. Let me try to explain. I would like
legal rules about products liability to reflect my choices about product
safety, fairness, insurance, and any other relevant factors. I would
also like them to reflect what is best for me. I would certainly protest
if I were not allowed to make my own choices. After all, who knows
31. See the discussion of and citations to the "contractarians" collected in Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 713-35.
32. See JoN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-37 (1971).
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better than I what is best for me? On the other hand, it is quite clear
to me, looking back as a fifty-one-year-old, that at many stages in my
life I did not know what was best for me, or if I really did, I was unwilling or unable to do what was best for me. I know more and can do
better now. More humbling still, I am confident that I will look back
in ten or twenty years and understand that some of my early choices
of today would have been beneficially different had I possessed the
greater understanding (not foreknowledge) and perspective that I
then will have.
Knowing this, if I thought my choices about product risk allocation or about anything else were being interfered with for my own
good, I probably would do no more than grumble, especially if the
person interfering were someone who loved me dear. 33 I would think
33. Understand that I say this having a great deal of disrespect for those in power here in
Indonesia who postpone democracy with all sorts of vacuous talk about the need for the wise
rulers to make choices which will benefit the unsophisticated people. See, e.g., Democratization
Developing Fast Enough. Expert, JAKARTA PosT, Feb. 26, 1996, at 2. I also say this being firmly
on the side of greater patient autonomy in the context of medical relationships about which I
teach. I don't generally like people telling me or others what is best for us.
Given that mindset, I am not easily convinced that a choice which conflicts with the one I
would make myself is "best" for me. Nevertheless, there are several factors at work in my life
that remind me that this is not infrequently the case. First, as I indicate in the text, I see clearly
now my own failings in making choices that were best for me earlier in my life. I say that
without a belief that I am the prisoner of earlier bad choices. Rather, I am a fortunate escapee
from bad choices I would have made if I had been allowed to make them, as well as the lucky
beneficiary of choices I made either because I deferred to the better judgment of my parents,
spouse, or sager friends or because my untutored instincts led me luckily. Second, I have been
participating more actively in the past decade in formal and informal discussion groups, in which
people who know, respect, and trust each other to an acceptable degree talk about readings or
experiences they share. That experience has emphasized to me how limited are my understandings of the world and how dependent are the choices I make on my particular life background
and narrow understandings.
Third, this year in Indonesia has brought me into close contact with many people who have
very different ideas about choices-for their own lives and for social policy-than do I. My
Indonesian law faculty colleagues approach their teaching jobs quite differently from the way I
do. My Idonesian friends and students make quite different-often hair-raising, to me-choices
in regard to personal risk. Most of the expatriate community here is made up of Christian missionaries, for most of whom God has much more of an active, foregrounded position in daily life
than is the case for me. Many of those missionaries are fundamentalist Christians, whose choices
about public behavior and social policy tend to differ far more from my own than do the choices
of most people in my primary communities in the United States. My respect for and emotional
attachment to many of these Indonesian and expatriate people often leads me again to question
the wisdom of choices, even important choices, that I made last week, last year, or last decade.
Speaking of decades reminds me of a discussion we had in a Salatiga discussion group several
months ago, centered on a short article by Mary Ain Glendon about the 1950s in Chicago. See
Mary Ann Glendon, Lost in the Fifties, FIRST THINoS, Nov. 1995, at 46-49. Professor Glendon's
basic point, in her review of a book about the changes in certain Chicago neighborhoods from
the fifties to the nineties, was that the autonomous choices of the people who lived in spiritually
and emotionally rich, albeit limited, communities 40 years previously had led to the evaporation
of community and that such evaporation has meant a decline in the quality of people's lives. See
id. Most people in the discussion group felt her characterization of people's choices as ultimately
misguided to have been appropriate.
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I knew what was best for me, but would recognize that I might not.
Of course, it is much easier for me to recognize that with respect to
you two girls: I have become acquainted with you in your childhood, a
time when your weaknesses at knowing what is best for you are most
obvious. Moreover, like many parents, I am much more aware of the
fragility of your health and life than I am of my own, or you are of
your own.
So, I would like to have a legal rule about generic liability that
reflects the choices a loving parent would make in bargaining with a
product supplier whose product posed risks to his children. After all,
even the legal scholars who seek to fashion legal rules on the basis of
what people would choose-the autonomy principle-are working
from their understandings of what others would think best for themselves. To the extent that they are "imagining" choice, through the
medium of their own imaginations or through some other medium,
such as consumption patterns, 34 such scholars are working from their
notions of what your choices would be, not from those choices themselves. I am going only slightly further. I want to determine legal
rules on the basis of the choices I think you would make if you had the
fuller understandings of your world, of your value as a human being,
and of your limitations that a loving parent has. 35 While I still find the
principle of autonomy an attractive guide to which products liability
rules we should have, my experiences with you-and in Indonesia,
Finally, living in an intensively Christian community, in which the presence of God in people's lives is focused on to a much greater extent both publicly and privately than I am used to,
has exposed me to a different kind of choice-making process. In this community, most people
seek to make their choices not so much on the basis of their own needs and wants as on the basis
of God's will. Our friends devote considerable time and energy to prayer, meditation, and to
other attempts to understand the will of God, on what I think of as minor, as well as major,
matters. In such an atmosphere, I tend to be less dogmatic about my own knowledge of what
choices are best for me.
34. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 645, 668-69 (1985) (defining what most informed and competent parties would want in a
liability standard by examining market behavior). It has been official government policy in the
environmental area to determine how much people value human life by examining how much
they are willing to pay for that life. See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 528-29 (1992). That has been determined through
various methods, including the examination of wage rates in occupations which are thought
more dangerous to life than others. See id.
35. Such a position from which to determine legal rules finds somewhat further exposition
in the writing of scholars who focus on "connnection" as the predominant reality of human
existence rather than on "individuality." See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts
on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848; Leslie
Bender, A Lawyer's Primer of Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985). Such thinkers not surprisingly place less emphasis on "autonomy" as the meta-principle to guide the formation of legal rules.
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where I sense massive unawareness of the dangers inherent in many
activities in which people engage 36-lead me to find the principle of a
loving parent's choice at least equally attractive. In some ways, it may
be even more attractive because it ameliorates some of the shortcomings of individual choice regarding risk that are revealed in scholar37
ship about cognitive psychology.
Moreover, with respect to many of the products that would be
affected by the rules of generic liability, an agreement about risk allocation between you and the product distributor is a chimerical notion.
While you might well strike a generalized agreement with the makers
of ice cream or, God forbid, cigarettes that you consume, the dangers
to you from handguns, asbestos products, or dum-dum bullets, none of
which you are likely to purchase yourself, are immune to your bargaining power. Since you would not wish to own or use either the
handgun or the bullet-and, hopefully, not the cigarette-even a hypothetical bargain between you and the product distributor would demand legal rules with as high a level of safety as possible. 38 In regard
to such products it is difficult to know how to service autonomy concerns through legal rules. It is less difficult to relate legal choices to
safety concerns.
I would add a final word of caution, lest you chafe too angrily
under what feels like parental usurpation of your right to guide your
own life. This notion of autonomy as a determinant of product liability rules should not be limited to answering the question: "How would
most consumers allocate the risks of harm to themselves if they were
able to bargain costlessly with the product manufacturer?" Auton36. See, e.g., Zatni Arbi, Why Shouldn't We Operate a Nuclear Plant in Indonesia?,
POST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 5. Having traveled not infrequently between cities in Java this
year, I share the widely held view that motor vehicle transport here is far more dangerous than it
is in any of the 50 states I have visited in the United States. Nevertheless, a minuscule portion of
Indonesian car drivers or passengers use seatbelts. A much higher percentage of Indonesians
than Americans travel these dangerous highways on motorcycles, frequently at night, usually
with one or more passengers, often without lights. On several occasions I have encountered
workers who work with asbestos products or with pesticides. Not one has used any special protection, other than the gloves worn by the pesticide-sprayers. My limited experience suggests
that Indonesian people are no less unhappy about being seriously injured-or about having
death or serious injury befall their loved ones-than are American people.
37. See generally Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193 (1994).
38. I confess to being somewhat uncertain here how the consumer sovereignty norm would
play out with resepct to persons at risk as bystanders-persons who neither buy nor use a product, but are nonetheless at risk when it is used. While I expect that autonomy scholars would
subsume the wishes of this group in the broader consumer consensus about what they want from
products generally in the way of risk allocation, the application of autonomy principles to rules
governing the rights of bystanders seems less clearly appropriate than their application to determine the liability rights of consumers and users.
JAKARTA
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omy/consumer sovereignty in this regard can also be served by legal
rules which reflect how consumers would want a product maker to
interact with persons who were injured by the company's product. We
are not just our consumption patterns. In addition to being people
who want and demand value for your money, you are generous, compassionate people. You will, I expect, grow up to be people who vote
for public officials whose policies will take your money, by taxes, and
return it not to you but to those less fortunate than you. Products
liability law should honor your choices in life by reflecting those parts
of you as well.
In the end, I will not ignore in this article your legitimate concern
with autonomy: the ability and means to design and follow your own
life plan. 39 Ultimately, my proposal regarding generic liability will
provide you-and others-a safety valve for escaping a loving parent's preferences for the law's allocation of generic product risk. 40
Nevertheless, the autonomy you will start with in the law vis-a-vis
product risks will be that which comprises the choices a loving parent
would make to maximize his/her children's chances for having the
ability and means to design and follow their own life plans.
C. Wealth: Security and Opportunity
I also want you to have wealth, but only secondarily. I recognize
that while wealth may not be a precondition to formulating a life plan,
some measure of it is usually required for you to be able to follow
such a plan. I want you to have as good a chance as you can get to
avail yourselves of what is important to you in life. That means-to
39. This truncated description of autonomy is borrowed from David Owen's much richer
description in David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 438 (1993). Professor Owen seems to contradict my
grant of highest priority to my children's safety interests. He says, for example, that "the first

and most important function of the law is to protect and promote freedom or autonomy." Id. at
439. He later speaks skeptically of "the common assertion that safety interests of potential vic-

tims are inherently of a higher order than the interests of actors in 'mere' money and convenience," id at 469, and approvingly of the "choice-harm principle" which says that society should
give no initial preference to security over action. See id. at 444. It must be remembered that
Professor Owen's writing focuses on the creation of a system of social justice, while my focus in
this Section is on defining what people who buy products really want from the law. Moreover,
because I see freedom from serious injury or death as a prerequisite to exercise of the sort of
life-planning and goal-achieving which Professor Owen describes as autonomy, perhaps we do

not disagree so much. John Attanasio, who has written thoughtfully about the importance of
autonomy, seems to share that view. See John B. Attanasio, The Principleof Aggregate Autonomy and the CalabresianApproach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988).
40. I will propose that distributors of generically liable products be able to disclaim that

liability in return for selling the product at a lower price, under certain conditions. See infra Part
II.A.
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some extent-your having optimal access to monetary wealth, which
you can use in exchange for many of the things you will want. Perhaps
more significantly, I want you to be protected from catastrophic assaults on your financial security. Like most people, I imagine, I see a
descent into financial ruin as far more important than a ticket to travel
up the financial ladder, even where each trip is financially equidistant
41
from your starting point.
I am not too concerned about this aspect of your lives in relation
to tort rules, however. I simply do not think your particular level of
wealth-at least insofar as tort law will affect it-will have much to do
with the quality of your life, which is my real concern. I acknowledge
that the product liability rules we choose will influence somewhat
overall levels of financial well-being in America, Indonesia, or wherever such rules are imposed. The costs of paying claims and of reaching decisions about whether and how much to pay must be borne by
product distributors. Depending on such things as the competitive
market structure and the nature of the demand curve(s) with respect
to a product found defective, some, much, or all of those costs will be
added to the prices consumers pay for the product. Insofar as the
legal rules increase the costs associated with deciding about and paying claims for compensation for injury, products will cost more. That
will decrease people's wealth, in that it will decrease the purchasing
power of the money they have. Rules which decrease the costs associated with deciding about and paying such claims will increase societal
wealth.
That having been said, I certainly would prefer a tort system
which diminished as little as possible the wealth available to you and,
perhaps more importantly, to our Indonesian friends who live much
closer to survival standards than you are likely to live.42 Nevertheless,
the extent to which the tort system at its clumsiest will diminish the
wealth available to you seems small. Even in the heavily litigated
41. This may be thought to expose my lack of entrepreneurial spirit. I confess to having less
of that than most entrepreneurs I know. However, it seems to me that entrepreneurs take
chances of financial ruin either with the belief that the odds distinctly favor their success or with

a sense that they have a financial safety net under them-if only in the generosity of family or
friends-that will stop their tumble into financial ruin. I suspect few regard the prospect of a
financial rise as just as appealing as a financial fall, of equal distance, into poverty.

42. Indonesia is a poor country. The average annual income per person was only $605 in
1993. See JAVA, GARDEN OF TmE EAST 296 (Eric Oey ed., 2d ed., 1995). A Swiss friend here in
Salatiga, who owns a fish-farming business, told us that he could not afford to establish such a
business in the nearby Philippines because the cost of labor there was too high. Conversation
with Rudi Lamprecht, in Salatiga (Dec. 31, 1995). Here in Indonesia, he said, a company needed
to pay its unskilled workers the equivalent of $1.50 per day. See id.
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medical practice field, doctors on average pay only a small portion of
their total overhead for liability insurance. 43 An increase of one or
two dollars in the cost of a visit to the doctor would not be pleasant,
but would hardly make for a significant shift in the quality of your life.
Perhaps more to the point, if the stricter tort rules which cause product prices to rise also increase product safety, as recent research suggests they do,44 then overall social wealth might actually increase as
fewer resources were wasted on the care of injured persons and as
more persons were able to contribute their full productive resources
to society.
Even if such clear differences as choices between no manufacturer liability and strict manufacturer liability were at stake-the kind
of choice most likely to have an impact on wealth available in the
society-I doubt that the quality of your life would be much affected.
Wealth, it must be remembered, is just a surrogate for utility-happiness, quality of life. That is what I am really concerned about, for you
and others. I don't believe small variations in wealth will make any
significant difference in the quality of your lives. Indeed, I am not
even sure gross variations will make much of a difference. When one
of the pan-Asian organizations surveyed citizen life satisfaction a few
years ago, Indonesians ranked number one in Asia, even though they
were poorer on average than most Asians. Japanese ranked lowest,
even though they were the richest outside of the Middle East.45 Dis43. See Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice:
Thoughts About the DeterrentEffect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939 (1984). Having
neither this article nor other empirical work available to me here in Indonesia, I have to rely on
my possibly faulty memory, that other studies have also shown that liability insurance premi-

ums-or self-insurance reserves-add at most a few percentage points to the costs of products
and services. That is not true of all products: I have been told by an executive of a company that
makes ladders that an extraordinarily high percentage of a ladder's cost is attributable to liability
costs. My concern, however, is for the overall dimunition of my children's and friends' wealth
due to varying liability rules.

Insofar as liability insurance premiums are used to actually pay compensation to injured
persons, it is not appropriate to regard them as diminishing the overall wealth available to any of
the rest of us. Moreover, even the most radical differences among liability rules would not ap-

proximate the difference between tort law and no tort law which most of the remainder of a
liability insurance premium represents (other than the administrative costs equivalent to those
which some other compensation system would entail).

Accordingly, it substantially overstates tort law's overall wealth dimunition potential to
equate it to even the small diminution in wealth represented by the percentage of a product's
price due to its maker's liability insurance costs.
44. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (comprehensive recent analysis of theoretical and empirical information about tort law's impact on safety). For a fuller discussion of the safety effects
which can be expected to flow from generic liability, see infra Part III.A.
45. See, e.g., Most Asian Poor Happy, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 27, 1993, at 42A;
Joanna Pitman, Have a Nice Day-in Tokyo, TimEs (London), June 1, 1993. The investigation,
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cussions here in Salatiga among expatriates from Australia, Europe,
and North America have been nearly unanimous in the belief that
Indonesians seem happier in general than do citizens of our (substantially wealthier) home countries. As a family, we have certainly made
do with substantially less in the way of wealth-dependent amenities
this year than we do in the Unites States, yet our levels of life satisfaction have been unusually high.
I say all this not to dismiss tort law's effects on wealth: all of us
would prefer legal rules which have more positive wealth effects,
other things being equal. Rather, I say it to remind readers why these
differing wealth effects need not be of great concern as we make
choices among possible liability rules.
1. Financial Security
My concern is greater, however, when faced with the prospect
that choosing one tort rule as opposed to another might leave you
significantly less protected from the risk of financial ruin in the event
you are seriously injured. Serious injury can disable you and cause
you to run up mammoth medical expenses. A products liability lawsuit can gain you compensation for those injuries, such that you will
end up financially better off than you were before the accident, even
after you pay your attorney. 46 This is often referred to as tort law's
"insurance" function. 47 In the context of generic liability, the law is
providing you insurance against the possibility that you will be injured
by a product whose inherent risks outweigh its social utility.
You seem at risk in this regard. Significant numbers of Americans go without adequate health insurance for substantial periods of
time in their lives. While you two-both healthy, intelligent, and
achievement-oriented, as well as the children of upper-middle-class
parents-have a better-than-average chance of having good long-term
health insurance coverage, I cannot be confident that you will escape
large uninsured medical bills. I am even less confident that you will
by Survey Research Hong Kong, found 94% of Indonesians described themselves as "happy,"
while only 64% of Japanese did so. The research firm's managing director qouted an old Chinese saying with the survey release: "You can be content even if you are poor, but if you are not
content, you will be unhappy even if you gain riches."
46. You could be financially better off after full tort compensation from an accident because
a damage award would contain substantial sums attributable to your pain and suffering. Estimates are that nearly 50% of tort awards are attributable to noneconomic loss. See II AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY

201 (1991) [hereinafter, ALl REPORTERS' STUDY].
47. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson
and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (1992).
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have a form of disability insurance to replace your income if you are
permanently disabled. Most people do not have such insurance
against long-term wage loss.
Moreover, while I write particularly to you, to enhance my focus
on reality and on what I really want from tort law, I must not thereby
ignore the realities of most people's lives where they may be less privileged than yours. Quite simply, serious injury or illness, without adequate health or disability insurance, is a horror which cannot be
ignored. In Indonesia, the risks of uninsured serious injury are much
higher. Indonesian society is far more dangerous-in both health and
accident terms-than is American society. 4s Few Indonesians seem to
have health insurance. 49 The social safety net has a lot more holes:
there is no equivalent of even the Social Security Disability Insurance
48. I do not have access to comparative accident statistics from the two nations. Such statistics would not mean too much in any event, given the highly unreliable nature of many government-generated statistics here in Indonesia. However, I can assure the reader that it is the
unanimous confident opinion of every person with whom I have spoken in Indonesia-both
Indonesian and expatriate-who has significant experience in both countries that Indonesia is
more dangerous, with respect to illness and injury, than is America. I will recount for the reader
some of the observations which lead me to believe that. First, in ordinary travels around Salatiga, a city comparable in size to that in which I live in the United States, I have seen far more
near-miss traffic accidents than I would have seen in a comparable time period in Syracuse, my
United States home. Second, even in the face of what everyone seems to agree is a pretty high
risk of traffic accidents (blind passing, on the main two-lane roads, particularly by the multitudes
of intercity buses, seems to be the norm), I have seen only one Indonesian citizen (a Cornelleducated Jakarta sophisticate who is married to an American) put on a seat belt while riding in a
car this year. In most vehicles in which I have ridden seat belts have been removed or disabled.
The rate at which men smoke here-and the incidence of public smoking-far exceeds that .in
the United States. Children regularly join their parents on the family motorbike/motorcycle, so
that it is common to see three persons riding on a-motorcycle and not unusual to see a family of
four. Workers applying pesticides to crops in the spectacular terraced fields of the Dieng Plateau
near here did so with no masks or protective clothing other than gloves, with chemicals dripping
out of the tanks they wore on their backs and the hoses which enabled them to hand-spray the
crops. Young men and boys regularly hang out the doors of the moving buses and small vans
which provide public transportation throughout Central Java.
49. In one of my Corporate Law: Civil Liability classes at Satya Wacana University this
semester, as I was discussing first- and third-party insurance, I asked the class of about 80 students how many of them had health or any other sort of insurance that would pay their medical
bills if they were seriously ill or injured. Not one student raised his/her hand. In the face of my
incredulity, no one would change her response. The young law faculty member who translates
for me in that class then reported that neither he nor other members of the faculty had such
insurance.
Admittedly, medical care in Indonesia is remarkably inexpensive. For example, my entire
treatment for a partially torn achilles tendon, which included two casts and three visits to the
doctor, cost less than $40. Nevertheless, medical care for serious injuries can be very expensive:
extensive surgery on the leg of a Satya Wacana student who was injured by an out-of-control car
at the same time that car struck one of my expatriate colleagues ran his immediate medical bills
close to $800. The student had to depend on extensive fund-raising from a local church and from
a society for students from his island in eastern Indonesia in order to defray the two-thirds of his
bills that had been paid as of this writing, two months after the accident.
This anecdotal evidence received some support from a recent article in Indonesia's national
English-language daily newspaper, reporting that developing nations account for only five per-
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that provides you two a modicum of protection in the event of serious
50
long-term disability.
Ordinarily, therefore, I would want some protection against such
possible financial ruin for you and others from tort law. While I am
quite sanguine about the effects of minor wealth decreases on the
quality of your lives, short or long periods in poverty would, I expect,
make your lives fairly grim. Even the incomplete insurance which tort
law affords-only against accidental injuries caused by another's
fault-would be welcome. Unfortunately, tort law's insurance comes
very dear. You would be paying a lot more for the same amount of
health or disability insurance if you obtained it through the tort system than you would if you bought it elsewhere, through similar firstparty coverage. 51 So, were I to demand of the tort system that it insure you and others against medical costs and lost wages which might
ruin you and others, I would be demanding a number of what seem to
be silly things: (1) that you and others buy a good (health and disability insurance) that you all would not buy on your own accord; (2) that
the good I require you to buy is useful in only a small percentage of
the cases in which it is needed (those serious injuries caused by another's provable fault); (3) that when you do buy the good, you have
to buy it with expensive trappings (insurance against noneconomic
harms) that even I don't care that you have; and (4) that you have to
buy the good at what is by far the most expensive store in town. 52 On
the other hand, to cast away the idea of getting even this limited, tooexpensive insurance from tort law, consigns you and many Americans
to a risk of impoverishment, and almost all Indonesians to financial
ruin, if you or they happen to be one of the unlucky victims of serious
injury from another's tort.
In the end, as the above discussion suggests, I am equivocal about
asking products liability law for insurance protection for you and
cent of the volume of insurance premiums of the world's leading insurance companies. See Disasters Get More Disastrous, JAKARTA PosT, Apr. 1, 1996, at 5.
50. For a reminder of the inadequacies in even the more extensive public aid programs for
persons without private health and disability protections injured accidentally in the United
States, see PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF
TORT LAW, ch. 3 (Yale Univ. Press 1997).
51. Whereas first-party health insurance pays out to sick or injured persons about 85-90%
of what it takes in in premiums, liability insurance-the source of insurance payments obtained
through the tort system-pays out to injured people more in the neighborhood of 50% of what it
takes in in premiums. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
52. Not even to mention that by making you buy this good at the "tort store," I require you
to shop where the seller provides lower-income people than you with a much less useful good
and higher-income people a much more useful good, yet charges all of you the same price.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:21

others. For you, I mostly don't want it: your chances of having adequate resources and caution to buy sufficient health insurance and
poverty-denying disability insurance 53 are pretty good. I want it lukewarmly for others, particularly our Indonesian friends, who are not
likely to be so fortunate. Just as it will take some time for the "culture" here to adapt to wearing seatbelts, the prevalence of first-party
insurance will arrive, I am confident, long after it has become something which "rational" consumers would want. Even for these others,
I only want tort-provided insurance if the state cannot be convinced to
provide more of a safety net to the sick and injured.54 The needs of
people who I believe would be willing to pay for more health and
disability insurance if they understood the economic risks and benefits
better, combined with the knowledge that the high cost of tort-based
insurance results somewhat from its provision of safety as well as insurance, 55 move me to this point of equivocal reaching-out to tort's
insurance function.
D. Justice
I am, if anything, even more equivocal about wanting much justice for you and others from the tort system. I say that not being at56 all
equivocal about justice: I think legal rules must not be unjust. I
think the tort system in America offers more in the way of justice than
many legal institutions. 57 I applaud and admire the efforts of many to
examine the meaning of justice in the tort system and prescribe its
53. In other words, disability insurance something like I have through my work: enough to
keep my head above the poverty waters in the event of long-term disability, but not much more.
Private disability insurance supplements, which I investigated once, were quite expensive (suggesting, I expect, that my vision of my own chances of being disabled is woefully optimistic).
54. For a thoughtful exposition of the kinds of disability programs which could fill in the
safety net gaps in American society, see STEPmEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WrTH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989).

55. Because the tort system provides safety, through its deterrence of dangerous behavior,
see infra Parts II.B, III.A, persons receive not just insurance, but also safety when they pay for its
operations. Therefore, the much greater administrative costs which are taken out of the liability
insurance premium dollar, in comparison to first-party premium insurance dollars, must be understood as a result of the former's provision of more than just insurance. In the same fashion,
your Uncle Chris, who sells life insurance, among other things, would not automatically tell his
clients to buy term life insurance rather than whole life insurance just because the former costs
substantially less for the same amount of insurance protection. Whole life insurance provides
something more than just insurance (it provides savings), just as tort-based insurance does.
56. I even feel strongly enough about the place of justice in the legal system that I joined six
faculty colleagues at Syracuse to create and implement a mini-course on justice which we integrated into the first-year course of study on an experimental basis about four years ago.
57. See, e.g., BELL & O'CoN, LL, supra note 50, ch. six.
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implementation.58 I just don't know how important it is for you and
others to get justice, per se, from the tort system.
As best as I can figure it out, justice has primarily psychic significance for us and others. While I do not belittle psychic satisfactions,59
those psychic benefits which we or others will receive from tort rules
being more just rather than less just seem small. If just, legal rulesand thus the world as a whole-will make more sense to each of us.
Those of us who work hard to follow Golden Rules of just behavioramong whom you are more likely than average to be numbered-will
feel somewhat demoralized by a legal system that seems to reward the
inconsiderate and careless as much as the considerate and careful.
Those of us who feel strongly that humans should follow the paths laid
out by a Divine Being 60 may feel offended by tort laws which are not
just and thus seem to reject God.
Nevertheless, the reactions I see around me to injustices far more
profound and, often, more personal than any which will emanate from
the tort system suggest to me that the psychic dissatisfaction produced
in most of us by even substantial injustice in products liability rules
will not be great. Indonesians live in a world far more obviously full
of injustices than do Americans. 61 Islam is a strong social force here.
58. For a thoughtful recent article examining justice in the products liability area, with copious citations to many who have devoted their thinking to justice issues in tort law, see Owen,
supra note 39.
59. See, e.g., Bell, Bell Tolls, supra note 9. More than other torts scholars of whose work I
am aware, I have focused on the extent to which people involved as parties to tort lawsuits are
likely to obtain some kind of important personal satisfaction in the course of their litigation
against an entity they think responsible for their serious personal injuries. See, e.g., BELL &
O'CONNELL, supra note 50, ch. 7; Peter A. Bell, Tort Law's Neglected Meaning (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Among the potentially personally significant aspects of a
tort litigant's experiences, a tort lawsuit may: (1) allow a victim to assert power over her injurer
by calling it into court, making it listen and respond to her, and making it explain its alleged
wrongdoing; (2) allow the victim revenge, by making the injurer suffer publicly and pay; (3)
allow the victim with the help of her lawyer to try to make sense of what has happened to her
life; (4) allow the victim to tell her story of what has happened to her life, in an environment of
formal respect and attention; and (5) allow the victim to take some positive steps in reaction to
the serious damage to her life. See BELL & O'CONN LL, supra note 50; Bell, supra.
60. I am trying with this phrasing to include followers of most major religions. Situated as I
am close to a strongly Christian enclave in a 90% Moslem country, I clearly mean to include
Christians and Moslems.
61. Indonesia has been ranked by at least one survey of major countries as the most corrupt
nation in the world. Cf., e.g., ImportersSay Bribery Rampant at Tanjung Priok,JAKARTA POST,
Apr. 19, 1996, at 1. In the form of the need to pay people in authority in a situation-especially
government officials-some amount of extra money in order to obtain what one wants or avoid
what one does not want, this corruption is widespread, so much so that it has become just another expected cost of getting things done, a part of the routine. Discrimination on the basis of
religion, gender, and ethnic origin is much more open in Indonesia than in the United States.
See, eg., Arief Budiman, Indonesia and Malaysia Face Racism Allegations, JAKARTA PosT, Apr.
19, 1996, at 1. While not all of what I understand to be injustices are so regarded by Indonesians,
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Yet, for the most part, Indonesians do not display significant unhappiness about what they are pefectly willing to acknowledge are injustices. As best I can make out from daily newspaper reading and from
conversations with Indonesians and long-resident expatriates, the Indonesians most likely to be motivated to some kind of verbal or physical action against injustices are those who are hurt materially by the
injustice. Indonesians seem generally willing to accept systemic injustices so long as the public systems seem to enhance their material
standard of living. For the most part, Americans seem to react similarly to injustice: they don't like it, but most seem to accept injustice
without major outrage unless it impacts fairly directly on them or on
62
their group.
With respect to the products liability rules with which this letter is
concerned, I suspect that the degree of justice in them won't have
much significance even where they impact directly on us. If you girls
are ever involved in a products liability lawsuit, the rules' injustice
probably will not bother you a whit unless you lose. Then, I imagine,
the injustice of your treatment will seem like salt being rubbed in a
wound. However, my experience with litigants who lose lawsuits is
that they regularly feel their treatment by the legal system was unjust,
even when just rules were being applied. In short, the degree of actual
justice in the legal rules does not seem to be the key variable in the
degree of unhappiness of those most affected by the rules.
Since the point of this discussion is to assess how important it will
be for you to get justice from the tort system, let me offer one piece of
personal testimony that probably also influences my conclusions. I
grew up believing that the United States was basically a just society. I
no longer believe that. 63 That saddens me when I focus on it. Nevermy conversations with colleagues and students here convince me that much of the "injustice" of
which I am aware is understood as morally wrong.
62. I recognize these are pretty sweeping statements. While I could cite here many examples that would support my conclusions, I am sure others could cite examples that would dispute
these conclusions. Having looked, with the help of research assistants for studies assessing the

importance to people of certain kinds of treatment within the judicial system in conjunction with
other work I have done, see supra note 59, and having found none, I feel that I must rely on my

general impressions about the importance of justice in the abstract to people in the United States
and Indonesia. I have tried to examine my own background for bias in this judgment. Since I

and my American friends have been, in our work and volunteer activities, more involved than
most people in advocacy for "rights" of disadvantaged groups to which we do not belong (we
would be put in the "liberal do-gooder" group by most observers), it seems that my bias would
be more in the direction of seeing massive outrage about injustice when that outrage was not
present, rather than vice versa. In the end, I recognize that my reasoning in the text will not be
convincing to those who do not share this general impression.
63. I recognize that many people would disagree with what I say here, if they were able to
figure out what I meant. This statement is relevant to the discussion in this letter/article, how-
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theless, I do not think that this belief has any significant impact on my
overall level of psychic well being.
In light of the above thinking, I have to conclude ultimately that
the amount of justice which tort rules furnish is not, in itself, particularly significant. You, I, and most others would clearly prefer just tort
rules to unjust ones. Nonethless, thinking about my tort preferences
for you, I would not trade any decrease in safety for an increase in
justice. I doubt if I would even relinquish any expected wealth increase or security in return for a justice increase.
E. At An Acceptable Cost
As with the pizza I spoke of at the outset of this Section, I want
products liability law to deliver all these "goods" to you at an acceptable price. I want safety for you above all, but I am not willing to make
you wear a protective helmet when you walk and ride to school each
day: little extra safety; significant cost. 64 While this concern can be
absorbed into our desire for wealth opportunity, I thought it important to state it separately, as a constant check on our resort to products liability law for satisfaction of our wants with respect to the risks
of injury from products.
Whether generic liability can provide what we want at an acceptable price 65 will be the subject of the following sections.
II.

THE BEAUTIFUL PIc-ruRE-AT THE BALL

So much for what I, you, and our Indonesian friends want from
the law about accident risks and personal injuries. Now, we must
bring those wants to bear on the issue that provoked this Symposium:
ever, not because of its rightness or wrongness as a matter of societal judgment, but because it
reflects my understandings. Living in Indonesia this year, and having lived and worked in China
in 1987-1988, I can certainly appreciate that the United States is a more just society in my eyes
than many, if not most.
64. In my mind, the cost is not so much the purchase price of the helmet as it is the discomfort and humiliation attendant on wearing such a helmet around Salatiga and at the school.
Given that one of you has already suffered a concussion at school this year, I am not entirely
ignorant of the safety advantages of regular helmet usage. You girls reach school each day here
by walking four blocks to a busy street, where you are picked up by a van and driven to school
by the driver of your friends Jay Shvi and Jenani.
65. Please understand that the notion of an "acceptable price" expressed herein includes
the idea that the price of what we get from the tort system should not be higher than the price of
those goods elsewhere. I am willing to pay $12.95 for a large pizza with extra cheese, pepperoni,
and peppers at the Pizza Hut in nearby Semarang. I am not aware of another source of pizza
within two hours of our home. I am not willing to pay $12.95 at out home in Syracuse, N.Y.,
because I can get an equally good such pizza for $10.95 at Varsity Pizza.
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Should a product's distributors66 be held liable where the risks of their
product outweigh its benefits, absent some reasonable alternative
design?
As long as I am writing to you, I would like to play a little with
that question in a context familiar to you and other readers: the story
of Cinderella. Some of the appeal of that story for us has lain in the
transformation of the outer trappings of Cinderella-a downtrodden
young woman-in such brilliant ways that it allowed all around her,
including the Prince, to perceive how beautiful she was. Products liability law certainly seems downtrodden at the moment. It is assailed
by critics both within and without academia and has been the subject
of widespread state and federal legislation to curtail its reaches. 6 7 Generic liability is so completely downtrodden that it seems to be visible
only in an occasional, quickly suppressed court decision or in academic circles such as these. 68 In this Section, we will look at what
could be the beauties of this much-maligned legal doctrine-somewhat as the Prince looked at Cinderella at the Ball. This will help us
understand better whether the search with the glass slipper-representing what I want for you and others from products liability law-is
worth undertaking in the face of claims that generic liability is more
akin to an Ugly Stepsister than to a downtrodden beauty.
A.

Your Carriageand Six White Horses

I told you in the introductory part of this letter that I think courtimposed generic liability is the best vehicle for getting you what I want
for you from the law. Since, however, I get to play the fairy godmother role in the fable part of this letter, I will tinker somewhat with
the standard-issue coach, six white horses, 69 and Cinderella. The ge66. In using the term "product distributors" in this letter/article, I mean to refer primarily to
product manufacturers and secondarily to those who are responsible for a product's progress

through the chain of distribution from manufacture/assembly to users and consumers. I do not
wish to express any opinion in this article on questions about who, in addition to the product
maker, appropriately should be held liable for injuries caused by product defects.
67. With respect to academic criticism, see Croley & Hanson, supranote 14, and the sources
cited therein. Regarding more popularized criticism and statutory reform, see, for example, PETER W. HUBER, LIABILrIY. THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Martha
Middleton, A Changing Landscape, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 56; Public Discontent, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1995, at 70 (roundtable discussion).
68. See RESTATEMENT (TmiRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCTS LIABaiLr'y § 2 cmt. c, Reporters'
Note at 94-97 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995); Bogus, supra note 3; Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 3, at 1314-28.
69. In referring to the "standard-issue" six white horses, I refer to the number and kind of
horses which the fairy godmother created from mice to take Cinderella to the Royal Ball in the
classic Cinderella story. Somehow, the idea has taken root in my mind that the coach was pulled
by six white horses. Having been unable to locate a copy of Cinderella here in Salatiga, I cannot
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neric liability which I think can approach the positive status of Cinderella has some slight variations from that which has been adopted or
proposed in the past. Generic (product-category) liability in general
will be imposed by a court when it concludes that the social risks of a
product outweigh its social utility. I would vary this formulation
marginally.
1. The Special Court
My version of generic liability law would first require a federal
law to be enacted which would establish a special judicial mechanism
for handling generic liability claims. That law should require that
claims of generic liability be decided only by a federal three-judge
court, 70 to which the claim would be removed when a plaintiff in a

products liability lawsuit raises it in either state or federal court. The
three judges could be selected by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, much the way single judges are now selected to oversee
consolidated multidistrict litigation. All cases involving claims of generic liability against the same product category-such as cigarettes or
ice cream-would be consolidated before this court. The three-judge
panel would decide solely the issue of generic liability-the product's
inherent risks compared to its utility. The decision on that issue with
respect to that category of product would be binding on all federal
and state courts, unless overturned by the Supreme Court. The court
of origin would decide other liability issues, which might arise in the
confirm my recollection. Having asked several expatriate families here what they remembered
on this point, and having received several different answers-also without available authority-I

have proceeded to use my recollection. Since the precise number of horses matters not at all to
the points I make about generic liability, please attribute any error in this regard to my desire to

err on the side of the colorful in the stories I tell my children.
70. In this proposal, the judges would sit without a jury and act as the triers of fact. I do not
make this suggestion because I think poorly of juries as decisionmakers. In fact, I find convinc-

ing the evidence marshalled in support of the conclusion that juries generally do as good a job of
decisionmaking as any institutional decisionmaker, including a judge. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks,
Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - and Why
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992). One reason I choose to have a three-judge court make

the decisions about the central risk-utility issue is to garner the advantages of group decisionmaking that are one of the jury's strengths.
Ultimately, despite my confidence in jury decisionmaking, I have chosen not to include it in
this proposal because: (1) it will make the proposal more politically palatable, given that many
who dislike the tort system find it most worrisome when juries are involved; (2) the public and
the legislature, conditioned by years of influential attacks on jury decisionmaking to be skeptical

about aberrance from juries, are more likely to give credence to a decision by a carefully selected
group of federal judges that a product is so dangerous that its risks outweigh its social utility.
Accordingly, the carefully considered decisions by the special court are more likely to remain

undisturbed and be accepted; and (3) unlike the three-judge court, a jury cannot be reconvened
to decide either the same question again, if necessitated by the existence of different litigants, or
to weigh the significance of new scientific evidence.
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case, but would have no jurisdiction to decide the issue of generic
liability.71
With respect to the litigation itself, the new law would encourage
the three-judge court to allow intervention where the court thought it
helpful to assure a full and fair presentation of evidence and argument
concerning the relative risks and utility of the product in question.
The three judges would be given the same authority to determine the
adequacy of lead counsel for both the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s)
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides for class actions.
The court would be encouraged to appoint its own experts pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 406 in order to optimize the quality of evidence and analysis of evidence presented to it. There would be no
jury. Appeal from the court's decision on the generic liability issue
would lie directly to the United States Supreme Court, with that
Court free to hear or not hear the case at its discretion. In the absence of substantial new evidence, the three-judge court's decision
concerning the product's risk-utility balance would preclude relitiga72
tion of that issue in subsequent lawsuits concerning the product.
This proposal aims to remedy concerns that makers of dangerous
products will face a multitude of generic liability lawsuits, that they
will face inconsistent liability judgments, and that their products will
be misjudged by wild-eyed decisionmakers. The special generic liability court procedure recommended herein should ensure that the generic liability issue-whether a product's inherent risks outweigh its
utility-will be decided in one judicial proceeding, at one time, for the
71. As a matter of judicial economy, the three-judge panel could, in its discretion, also decide issues related to a defendant's generic liability in the case at hand, such as causation, defense, and damages issues. The court should have complete discretion in this regard to avoid
having peripheral issues interfere with its primary job of determining whether the product's inherent risks outweigh its inherent utility. With respect to such peripheral issues which would
cause the plaintiff to fail on her claim regardless of her success on the generic liability issue, the
three-judge panel would proceed to hear evidence and rule on the generic liability issue so long
as it was satisfied that the plaintiff or intervenors on the plaintiff's side did (or were likely to)
fully and fairly present evidence from the injured person's perspective concerning the relative
risks and utility.
72. To further assure the conclusive nature of the three-judge court's risk-utility balancing
determination, and to prevent regular court battles over what constituted "substantial new evidence," the new law might place a complete bar on relitigation of the central generic liability
issue for two or more years. Insofar as this preclusion or that referred to in the text were barred
by constitutional due process requirements (I neither remember nor have the ability to investigate from Indonesia the precise parameters of the Due Process Clause with respect to issue
preclusion), similar preclusive power could effectively be given the three-judge panel's findings
by requiring that any subsequent case raising the issue of the generic liability of that product be
referred to that same three-judge panel for resolution. Plaintiffs and defendants would rather
quickly learn it was not wise to relitigate the issue.
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foreseeable future.73 While that would assuredly be expensive litigation, it would neither recur nor would it permit inconsistent verdicts.
The special generic liability court procedure would also minimize
the chance that an erratic-and wrong-decision would be made
about a product's risk-utility balance. Liberal intervention rules and
the "final" nature of the court proceedings should assure that evidence about risks and utility will be presented fully and well by the
parties. The requirement that there be three judges on the deciding
court markedly reduces the chances that the risk versus utility decisionmaker will have reactions to the evidence outside the normal
range. The decisionmakers will be federal judges, each of whom has
gone through a reasonably rigorous examination when nominated
which should reduce the chances that s/he is aberrant in any significant way. Moreover, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation will
be choosing the judges to staff the decisionmaking panel, thereby minimizing the chances that any of the judges on the panel will have displayed bizarre decisionmaking patterns. Finally, the requirement that
the decisionmaking court consist of three judges brings with it the
moderating effects of group decisionmaking, which even further
reduces the chances of an "outlier" 74 decision. Review by the United
States Supreme Court further reduces the now-very-tiny chances of an
obviously wrong decision. While that Court will not hear most appeals made to it, the widespread implications of most generic liability
decisions, when combined with the relative rarity of such decisions,
may make such review a significantly greater likelihood than that of
most kinds of cases, if the Supreme Court feels that some clear wrong
has been committed by the three-judge court. The expedited appeals
process should reduce substantially tradtionally high tort transaction
costs.
2. The Disclaimer Defense
A second variation, with respect to a claim of generic liability,
would make available to the product's producer and distributor(s) the
limited defense of plaintiff's express disclaimer of defendant's respon73. The generic liability determination could be reopened only upon the determination by a
court that substantial new evidence relevant to the product had been discovered.
74. I intend to use the term "outlier" here to describe a decision which would lie outside the
normal distribution of decisions by rational decisionmakers in response to a certain body of
evidence. That is how I understand statisticians to use the term.
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sibility for the product's inherently dangerous characteristics. 75 This
would exist in addition to other defenses commonly available to tort
defendants, such as statutes of limitations and immunities. The limited disclaimer defense would be available only in circumstances
where the plaintiff: (1) was the purchaser or an explicitly foreseen user
of the product; (2) had signed a clearly written waiver of tort rights in
the presence of, and after risk counselling by a consumer counsellor
employed by a state's consumer protection agency, 76 after all material
risks generic to that kind of product had been explained to the purchaser/user by both the written document and the counsellor, 77 and
after the amount(s) of the price reduction(s) for the product with the
waiver(s) by the purchaser and expected users had been set; and (3)
had reached the age at which automobile liability insurance compa78
nies first reduce substantially the premium for young male drivers.
A central clearinghouse would be established for the maintenance of
these written waivers. For products that consumers typically buy
many times, such as cigarettes or ice cream, purchasers who had executed a liability waiver with respect to that kind of product would be
issued a "(Kind of product) Waiver Card." They would have to show
75. This would be in addition to traditional defenses of comparative fault usually available
to defendants in design defect cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrv § 12, Reporters' Note at 304-06 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
76. The state consumer protection agency would be authorized by the law to charge product
manufacturers for the counselling services required for these waivers. The law would authorize a
national public agency, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, to set standards
which would govern how such charges were set. Those standards would be governed by the
principle that product makers should bear the reasonable costs of providing such waiver counselling, in fair proportion to the share of the counselling that is directed to waivers of liability with
respect to their products.
The consumer counsellors would provide counselling designed to repair as fully as possible
the information and risk appreciation shortcomings which their counselees bring to the disclaimer process, of the sort identified in Section III.B., infra. Since such counselling would go on
all across the United States, repeatedly, for a limited range of products, there will be ample
opportunity and incentive for the development of first-rate counselling aids and techniques
about the products.
77. The "material risks" would be those risks generic to the product which an ordinary
purchaser or user would want to know about in deciding whether to buy or use the product. Cf.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (setting a similar patient-oriented
standard with respect to health care providers' ability to obtain "informed consent" to the provision of medical services or products); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979). Of
course, the express waiver of tort liability would apply only to those dangers about which the
plaintiff had been informed.
78. My recollection is that this is around 25 or 26 years of age. I choose this as the standard
to determine an age before which waivers cannot be executed because it represents a judgment
by experts as to an age at which a substantial portion of the population has become more safe in
their behavior than in their teenage years when a large percentage of the population is notoriously well below average in its ability either to appreciate dangers or to act to avoid those
dangers.
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this card to a retailer in order to obtain the reduced "waiver" price for
79
a product.
This variation on traditional products liability doctrine 80 is a
safety valve, a market-based check on legal and academic (my) error.
It is a bow in the direction of your (and others') autonomy, in case you
feel strongly 8 ' that the increased costs associated with a product's generic tort liability are not worth the increased safety, wealth, and justice that such liability is likely to provide.
Just as I want to maximize the chances that the basic generic liability decision will be made correctly-by having a special tribunal decide if the product's risks outweigh its social benefits-I also want to
maximize the chances that your personal risk-utility balancing will be
made correctly as you decide whether to forego tort protection when
you buy a product. Accordingly, I have required the disclaimer procedure to have an extensive, individualized risk-counselling component.
This counselling should minimize the chances that when you or others
execute a waiver you will do so on the basis of a misunderstanding of
the relative risks or benefits or of the applicability of those risks and
benefits to your life. The individualization and the requirement that
the counsellor be a government employee should reduce the chances
that companies will unduly influence people to waive their tort rights
by mass information and persuasion strategies. 82 These counsellors
will develop an expertise with respect to communication about product risks to a variety of individuals which, over time, can be expected
to lead to optimal consumer understandings. The requirement that
79. For such repeatedly purchased products, manufacturers and other distributors would

clearly need to create a system whereby the different product prices paid to the retailer by consumers who had waived their generic liability rights and by those who had not waived their rights

would be accounted for in the differing amounts paid by the retailer to the manufacturer or
other distributor. While this might be complicated, it hardly seems beyond the capabilities of a
product distribution system which already copes smoothly with such complications as coupons
and recycling.
80. Courts generally will not allow disclaimers to bar persons from maintaining personal
injury actions against the distributors of products which have injured them. See RESTATEMENT
(TimR) OF TORTS: PRODUcTs LIABIutaY Reporters' Note at 312 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
81. Rather than just "grumbly." See supra text accompanying note 33.

82. There remains, nonetheless, a serious danger that the careful, informed consumer
choice implicit in the disclaimer system that I propose herein will be disrupted by strong product
distributor efforts to convince masses of consumers to waive their product liability rights. I understand that large numbers of smokers, ice cream eaters, handgun buyers, and the like, could
end up traipsing into the consumer counsellor's office so primed by manufacturer information to
execute the disclaimer that they would neither listen to nor hear what the counsellor had to say
to them. If that scenario developed, I would recommend either the promulgation of rules requir-

ing a balance of information presentation concerning the merits of consumers' waiver of their
tort rights (if that could be done consistent with the First Amendment), or withdrawal of the
option I propose here allowing the manufacturers to disclaim liability.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:21

you or others be at least the age at which automobile liability insurance rates first go down significantly for young men is designed to
have you make the choice at a point when people generally begin
to
83
better appreciate the meaning of risk information in their lives.
Moreover, disclaimers make sense in connection with generic liability where they might not with respect to other branches of products
liability. Because the material risks associated with a product will be
identified clearly in the litigation which originally establishes a product's generic liability, those risks can be easily identified and communicated to consumers for the whole product category. Being told at
the time of waiver exactly what their price advantage will be (e.g.,
"$1.00 less per pack"), consumers should be able to assess the costs
and benefits to them of tort protection with much more precision than
with respect to other product disclaimers. Product distributors, who
will obtain in one transaction a waiver for all of their products in a
particular category that they sell for years to come to a consumer, will
find it worth their while to pay for the complex disclaimer process
outlined herein. Consumers, who will obtain significantly reduced
prices 84 for a product each time they buy it for years to come, will find
it worth their while to devote the time, expense, and energy necessary
to undergo the process, perhaps with respect to several product categories in the course of one visit to a consumer counsellor.
83. I set the minimum disclaimer age at that at which automobile liability rates are first
lowered significantly for young male drivers because that age seems a good surrogate for a time
of life at which people begin to have a better ability to avoid dangers, whether that happens
because of an enhanced appreciation of risks or because of an increased ability to control one's
impulses. The existence of either such reason would suggest that the consumer is better able to
work with risk information. At such an age, and following such an individualized counselling
process, consumers are significantly more likely than they otherwise would be to understand and
appreciate the risks for them and those close to them associated with a product's purchase. They

also are better able to understand the real meaning to their lives of the lower product prices
which will result from their execution of the disclaimer. The failure to understand and appreciate the meanings of risks has been identified as a common obstace to "real" meetings of the
mind in disclaimers or other risk-related transactions. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 37, at 1208,
1225-41, 1243, 1245.

Setting the age minimum at that where auto insurance premiums for young men first goes
down makes many people, especially young women, wait longer to acquire disclaimer capability
than it takes them to reach the degree of risk appreciation possessed by the average 25- or 26year-old male driver. Since the disclaimer permits individuals to vary the legal rule that seems
best overall for society, making some people wait a year or two longer than necessary before
they are allowed to take on what society thinks are unwise risks does not seem a particularly
harsh restriction on their autonomy.
84. Since generic liability will probably apply only to unusually dangerous products, which
will cause quite a few injuries, it can be expected to add a considerable amount to the cost of
producing and selling those products. Where that liability is waived by a consumer, the product
manufacturer should be able to pass on a substantial portion of its cost savings in the form of a
price reduction.
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B.

The Ball (and Life Happily Ever After)

With the contours of this magically imagined generic liability in
mind, we can proceed to the Ball, where we can try to see just how
dazzling this creature can be. We need to take an initial look at her, in
light of what we want in a law, to see if she might be so attractive as to
have real potential for life happily ever after.
At first glance, generic liability looks like a real Cinderella. It
looks as though it will provide a healthy increase in the safety with
which I am most concerned, and will be just. Moreover, it will not
interfere substantially with my desire for autonomy and my more
lukewarm desire to maximize wealth protection and opportunity for
you.
The most attractive aspect of generic liability is the safety it
promises you. Generic liability should be a powerful force in the reduction of risks from some of the most dangerous products around. It
will do so in several ways. It will cause such increases in the price of a
dangerous product that the product's sales will be dramatically reduced or completely curtailed. Also, by these price increases, generic
liability will create strong market demand for safer substitute products, thereby stimulating their development, sale, and use. Imposition
of generic liability should also result in greater information about the
product's dangers being made available to the public, who can take
steps to reduce their exposure to such risks.
When the world of generic liability operates well, all of us will be
substantially safer. When a claim that a product distributor should be
liable because of the dangers inherent in the nature of its product
arises it will be referred immediately to the generic liability court. Capable lawyers for all the parties will do a good job of presenting the
most salient evidence concerning the dangers of the product and its
social value. 85 Capable experts-including neutral court-appointed
experts-will assist the judges to understand the significance of that
evidence in the context of the risk-utility balancing the judges must
85. The high stakes of the litigation and its all-or-nothing quality with respect to the imposition of generic liability should assure that the product distributor(s) mounts the best possible

defense. The quality of plaintiff representation is always a more questionable proposition in this
kind of "mass" tort case. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToXIc

DISASTERS INTm COURTS 37-53, 73-76, 120-21 (1987). Nonetheless, the potential for substantial contingency fees in this and future cases involving the challenged product, the liberal intervention rules, the consolidation of all tort cases involving the product before the special court,
and the requirement that the special court make an independent determination of the adequacy
of lead plaintiffs' counsel all increase the chances that the lawyering work on the victim/potential
victim side will be as capable as can be hoped for in this or any other forum.
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do.86 Capable questioning, by opposing lawyers and by the court, will
uncover the real value of the evidence proffered by the parties. The
three-judge court will examine impartially all the evidence about a
product-say handguns, cigarettes, or ice cream 87-will deliberate
carefully and reach a clearly explained conclusion concerning whether
the risks of harm to people (and/or property) from the product outweigh its social utility. Even if the court concludes that the product is
a net detriment to society it will not ban the product from continued
sale or use. Rather, a product distributor held liable in tort for these
harms will end up paying large sums of money in damages, since, for
the most part, 88 products subject to generic liability are those the use
89
of which causes many injuries or illnesses.
86. Expert evidence can be expected to include presentations by experts in the structures of
the markets for the product being attacked who would be able to testify concerning the expected
behavior of the product's consumers and users if the product is judged generically liable. Therefore, the special court would be able to consider in its weighing process the risks that accompany
the substitute products and behaviors to which consumers and users would turn in the event the
challenged product were forced off the market or its price dramatically increased by the imposition of generic liability.
87. I choose handguns and cigarettes as examples because they seem to be the primary
targets of advocates of generic liability and are also used by opponents of the doctrine to illustrate its flaws. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 3, at 46-64; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at
1305-08. I thought it would be most helpful to readers to discuss the doctrine in the context of
situations in which it realistically might arise. As mentioned in the introduction to this article/
letter, I discuss ice cream to keep readers and myself honest in dealing with generic liability
doctrine, lest personal antipathy to the products which are some of its main targets lead us to
gloss over the real difficulties inherent in the doctrine.
88. I use this cautionary phrase because the authors of the draft Restatement refer in an
example that seems the same as the generic liability they reject in their textual comments to an
injury caused by an exploding cigar at a birthday party. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF ToR-rs:
PRODUCt LIABItUTY 23, illus. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). The illustration emphasizes the

extremely low utility of the product in concluding that it would expose the manufacturer to
liability even if those risks of injury were inherent in the product. While the illustration says that
the risks of injury are high, it is unclear to me that exploding cigars begin to approach in their
dangerousness the products usually mentioned in connection with generic liability, such as cigarettes, handguns, alcohol, above-ground swimming pools, and asbestos. See Bogus, supra note 3,
at 37-64.
89. For an assessment of the massive numbers of injuries and illness associated with asbestos, tobacco, and handguns, three of the prime candidates for generic liability, see Bogus, supra
note 3, at 38-63.
Product distributors will pay out substantial sums in damages for such harms, even if it were
to be assumed that the product's victims regularly settled their claims for amounts less than their
full damages. Once generic liability was established for a product, the only substantial issues
that would remain in most tort suits against its maker would be causation and damages. While
these might be substantial issues, particularly in the case of claims against cigarette makers,
plaintiffs clearly would have a better chance of winning such suits than they do most current
products liability lawsuits. Their improved chances of success could reasonably be expected to
result in a higher percentage of claimants among persons injured by generically liable products
than exists among persons injured by products now. Likewise, plaintiffs suing makers of generically liable products will probably settle for a higher percentage of their actual damages than do
most products liability plaintiffs now.
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Facing a final judicial ruling that its product is generically liable, a
product distributor seems most likely to respond one of two ways.
Each way would contribute substantially to the prospects for safety
for you girls and others. First, the distributor may simply stop making
and selling the product. Second, the distributor may raise the price of
the product substantially, to a point where its income from sales of the
product will increase sufficiently to make up for the massive financial
outflow attributable to tort damage claims. 90 At the same time, the
distributor and potential competitors will begin to search for safer
products that the public might largely accept as substitutes for the
now-expensive generically liable product.
By definition, safety, at an acceptable cost, will be served if the
product is taken off the market. Having considered all relevant evidence that the most interested persons could offer, an impartial tribunal will have determined that the product cost society-including you
and all our friends-more in harm to persons and property than it
gave society in any kind of benefits. Chances are that the court will
have reached that decision without valuing your lives and well-being
as highly as would a loving parent.91 The product's disappearance
means you will be safer, to an extent well justified by the relatively
smaller loss in the product's social benefits.
So, too, safety will be served if the product remains on the market, but at the much higher price which reflects to a considerable extent its injury/illness costs. If there is any elasticity in the demand for
90. In fact, prices of generically liable products can be expected to rise by more than the
amount which the maker spends on defending against and paying for damage claims. As the
product price goes up, there will be some decline in its sales. Depending on the product distributor's fixed costs, the product price on the units that continue to be sold will need to rise to make
up for lost profits from those lost sales if the distributor is to be able to maintain the rate of
return it considers necessary or desirable on its investment.
91. Public bodies, which would include the special generic liability court, are notoriously
likely to use methods for valuing people's lives which undervalue those lives compared to the
values a loving parent would give them. For example, public agencies have tended to evaluate
lives using "willingness to pay" ("WTP") methodology. The evaluator, for example, tries to
extrapolate from the increase in wages paid in particularly dangerous occupations and the increase in risk of death in those occupations how much a worker really values his/her life. See,
e.g., PERCIVAL, supra note 34, at 528-29. Were public bodies even to use a "willingness to accept" ("WTA") methodology, their estimates of the value of human life would generally be
higher. See id. at 534-35. I certainly do not here want to jump into the middle of a highly
technical debate about which is the best methodology for a public body, such as the special
court, to use in evaluating human life and health. Nowhere have I seen methodologies suggested
that take into account the kinds of expenditures-of time, psychological concern, effort, and
money-which parents incur in the cause of keeping their children safe. Accordingly, if there is
any bias built in to the risk-utility balancing done by the special court, it seems to me that it is a
bias against safety, in that the court is likely to undervalue the risks to human life and health, in
comparison to the value that I would put on those risks from the loving parent perspective.
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the product whatsoever-and it would be rare if there were notfewer people will buy or use the product after a finding of generic
liability than did before the court ruling. Insofar as the product might
injure you as a bystander-as might cigarettes (secondhand smoke)
and handguns-that decreased use by others will make you safer at
virtually no cost to yourself. Insofar as you buy the product, you will
probably buy less of it, thereby making you safer.
Generic liability will also promote safety by increasing your and
the public's information about product safety. The trial and verdict in
a generic liability case seem likely to generate considerable publicity
in whatever country they occur. 92 Many product users and consumers
are likely to learn about the product's dangers from this media coverage. In addition, the sharply increased prices for the product will also
help to signal consumers and users about its dangers. This information is important: consumers and users are often aware of the utility of
a product to them, yet quite unaware of its dangers. For example, we
have four modes of public transport available to us for getting around
Salatiga this year: intercity buses, angkotas (small vans, running fixed
routes within the city), becaks (bicycle rickshaws), and dokars (horsepulled carriages). We have chosen which to use at which times largely
on the basis of convenience, speed, and price. We have heard, by
word of mouth during the course of the year, that some becaks have
tipped over while carrying large foreigners. 93 Similarly, one of my Indonesian law faculty colleagues cautioned me about having you girls
travel to and from school by dokar, because they have been involved
in accidents not infrequently. In both instances, this information has
altered our use of the vehicle. Had fares for any of these forms of
transport risen suddenly-as would have been the case had any of
them been held generically liable-we would have inquired as to why.
Upon finding that the price rise was linked to the product's dangerousness, we would have terminated or sharply curtailed our use of
that mode of transport.
92. The centralized decisionmaking function performed by the special three-judge court fits
nicely into media needs: an event easily noticed, because the case(s) will be assigned to the
special court well in advance of trial, and easily covered, because the events happen in one place
on a regular schedule. Given this fit, and the threat the lawsuit poses to a widely used product,
considerable media coverage of the generic liability case can be expected.
93. At 6'5" and 190 pounds, I am a giant by Javanese standards. Even your mom, only
slightly taller than average by American standards, dwarfs her Javanese counterparts. Until we
heard the stories told by a heavyset American woman who has lived in Salatiga for three years,
we had no idea there was a risk that becaks could tip over. We had never seen that happen, nor
had we experienced any tippiness during our rides.
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Generic liability should lead to increased safety information becoming available to product makers as well, at a particularly crucial
time. Knowing that they may be liable if they manufacture a product
the dangers of which are particularly serious-even if there is no reasonable alternative design-manufacturers will have an incentive to
look for possible dangers quite early in the process of developing a
new technology or product. 94 Initial research and development
processes are often biased against careful attention to dangerous side
effects because innovators' financial and personal incentives lead
them to focus on product efficacy. Yet, because the nature of the
products available on the market depends considerably on the early
paths that have been taken in technology research and development,
safety may be most enhanced if innovators can be moved to look hard
for possible dangers as well. 95 The threat that a manufacturer will be
held liable for its product's dangers, regardless of its uniqueness, could
well enhance that attention to such dangers at the early research and
development stages.
In a related, but less direct fashion, generic liability should also
contribute to a greater sense of responsibility for safety on the part of
producers. As that sense develops, as more of an ethic of responsibility for the untoward consequences of product manufacture grows
within the producing community, we should find more care to avoid
people's injuries being taken at all phases of the product development
and manufacturing process. I have become more sensitive to the importance of the development of this ethic of responsibility during this
year in Indonesia because so much of the commentary on serious accidents which have occurred here stressed the need for Indonesians to
develop a greater sense of responsibility for the harms done to
others. 96 I am less sure how much such development is possible
94. See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 149 (1995)
("Without some signal from the law that research on side effects has value, incentives to incorporate safety research are limited, and research on latent or uncertain effects will either be overlooked or postponed.").
95. See id. at 148-53.
96. See, e.g., Zatni Arbi, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that when some kind of disaster occurs,
there is a rush to blame others or nature, the author concludes: "We are not accustomed to
taking full responsibility for our mistakes, or preventing them in the first place .... Should we
rush ahead and operate a nuclear power plant in our primitive culture? Perhaps not now. Perhaps later, when we have developed a culture of safety."); Editorial, The Art of Confusion,
JAKARTA POST, Apr. 8, 1996, at 4 ("The sense of repsonsibility for wrongdoings is said to be a
rarity in this country."); Editorial, Fires and Supervision, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 13, 1996, at 4 (in
speaking about fires in public places and the lack of cities' enforcement of their fire codes, the
newspaper concluded: "The lack of responsibility stems from a lack of supervision and the indifference of fire victims and their families, usually poor people, who see any accident as the hand
of fate."); Editorial, A Matter of Responsibility, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 5, 1996, at 4 ("It is sad, but
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through tort law in the United States. The United States already has a
strong system of accountability for negligence. Nonetheless, it is a
country in which the most famous "tort story" of the past three years
remains that of the woman injured by spilling hot coffee on her lap
who sued McDonald's-and won! Where a company that had previously been notified of hundreds of incidents in which customers had
been scalded by spills of its unusually hot coffee can convince the
American public that it was a travesty of justice that it should be stuck
with any responsibility for an elderly woman's severe injuries there
seems room for improvement in the ethic of responsibility held by
American product distributors as well. Generic liability will make a
strong statement that producers who market especially dangerous
goods will have to bear their share of responsibility for the injuries
which result, even if we as a society are willing to tolerate the presence of those products on the market. It is certainly possible that this
statement of legal responsibility will filter into the thinking of the public and of corporate managers. Insofar as it does, there is likely to be a
ripple effect enhancing safety at all stages of the product development
and manufacturing process.
Finally, generic liability may increase safety by creating a market
for safer products that can substitute for-provide nearly the same
kinds and amounts of utility as-the product found generically liable.
Once the price of a product such as handguns, cigarettes, or ice cream
goes through the ceiling, the discovery, development, and marketing
of safer substitute products becomes much more feasible. The safer
product can suddenly be sold at a much higher price and still be
powerfully price-competitive with the now higher-priced generically
liable product. Knowing this, product makers will be more willing to
spend the substantial amounts necessary to develop, produce, and
market new products which might satisfy the desires which underlay
purchase of the more dangerous products. This is obvious with respect to ice cream: some products which don't contain its most dangerous characteristics have already been developed. Similarly, if
assured they could market their product at a high price, product makers might develop a small weapon that thoroughly stunned its victims
but did not do them permanent harm that could take over the market
from handguns which had been made much more expensive by generic liability. The same could be true for the development and protrue that we, Indonesians, are better known for our nonchalance when it comes to acting to
prevent accidents that could, though may not, cause loss of human life. We think the time has
come for us to develop a greater sense of civic responsibility.").
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duction of less noxious cigarette substitutes. While there are no
guarantees such safer substitute products will be developed, generic
liability certainly increases the chances of such development.
In short, generic liability seems to provide a considerable amount
of the safety which is the principal output I want for you from the tort
system. It may result in the withdrawal of the most dangerous products from the market. Where it does not, it assures either that there
will be a substantial decline in the use of these most dangerous products or that there will arise substantial market incentives likely to result in the development of at least some safer substitute products.
You and others should notice that this increased safety is provided by tort law in a way which interferes as little as possible with
your autonomy. Unlike most direct government regulation of a product, tort law will allow you to continue to use the unreasonably dangerous product so long as you are willing to bear (by paying for them)
your fair share of the social costs of your use of the product. 97 If the
product has extraordinary utility for you or poses inordinately low
risks to you-as might ice cream, which you love and against the dangers of which you may be somewhat protected by our family's hereditarily low cholestrol and fat levels-you can either pay the greatly
increased price or execute the generic disclaimer outlined above and
pay only a slightly increased price. 98
Incidentally, generic liability will provide you some significant
wealth protection if you are injured by the product. The American
Law Institute's study early in this decade estimated that the average
accident victim in the United States ends up bearing thirty-eight percent of her economic losses. 99 Were you injured seriously, you could
easily be impoverished by having to bear such a share of your losses.
You could also be injured at one of those times in your lives when
your private insurance coverage is weak or nonexistent. While this
wealth protection would come at a higher cost than would first-party
97. Admittedly, the substantial price hike for a product required by generic liability may
drive it from the market, thus interfering with your consumption choices. However, the product
would in such circumstances be no different from any potential product which does not have a

big enough market given the costs of its production to evoke product manufacture. That is not
normally regarded as an interference with consumer autonomy.
98. Even those who execute the generic liability waiver for a product will probably pay
more for the product than they would in the absence of generic liability. For consumers of ice
cream, that increase would probably be small, reflecting the costs inherent in some general
measures taken by a firm to deal with generic liability. For consumers of products which injure
bystanders, such as asbestos, handguns, and cigarettes, the price increase will be more substantial, even with the waiver.
99. See ALI REPORTERS' STUy, supra note 46, at 59.
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insurance providing the same sort of protection, some of each dollar
you pay for that "insurance" will also be buying you safety by knocking up the price of the dangerous product and thus reducing its overall
use. Moreover, the higher cost of this tort-provided "insurance"
might not be so great in generic liability cases because transaction
costs of deciding liability might be lower than in the average tort case,
given that the principal question of the product's "defectiveness" will
already have been decided by the special generic liability court. 00 In
addition, if you happen to be one of the persons whose wealth opportunities are most interfered with by the imposition of across-the-board
liability on the product, you can always protect yourself from generic
liability's greatest anti-wealth effects by executing the generic
disclaimer.
Finally, generic liability at the Ball looks extremely attractive because it wears a little touch of justice. That justice lies in requiring
companies which gain the benefits of producing and marketing products which they know will cause many injuries or illnesses to bear their
fair share of the injury costs which inevitably accompany the products.' 0 ' The product distributors will pay only where they have been
judged to be wrongdoers in the classic tort sense that they have taken
actions (the production and distribution of the product) which have
created unreasonable risks to society-that is, risks which outweigh

100. This is not to say that generic liability cases will not have significant transaction costs, of
the sort that make insurance garnered through a third-party insurer so much more expensive
than insurance obtained from a first-party insurer. For some of the products most likely to be
claimed against on generic liability grounds-such as cigarettes, asbestos products, and even the
ice cream which we use as an example in this letter-there are likely to be complex issues of
causation, which will consume substantial amounts of lawyer time and evidence-obtaining expense. A plaintiff claiming she was injured by cigarette smoke or by the fats or chemical additives in ice cream will find it daunting to prove that this exposure was what probably caused her
injuries. With respect to all the generically liable products, tort suits will have to deal with complicated issues about the nature and extent of the plaintiff's damages.
However, these issues are present in more ordinary products liability lawsuits as well. Difficult causation issues are not so likely to come up often with some generic liability cases-such as
those involving handguns or above-ground swimming pools. Regardless, by removing from the
full range of generic liability cases the key issue as to whether the product distributor is liable for
the injuries caused by its product, generic liability tort cases can expect to be simpler, quicker,
and less expensive to resolve than the ordinary run of products liability cases.
101. Because generic liability as I propose it here will retain the defense of comparative fault
ordinarily available in products liability actions, injured persons themselves will be required to
bear some-perhaps the major-share of their own loss, where they have been negligent in their
use of the product. This would be perhaps most obvious in lawsuits brought by cigarette smokers or by ice cream eaters for illnesses/injuries which were well known effects of the product's
consumption. The product distributor in such cases might bear some, but not all, of the responsibility for its product's dangers.
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the social benefits of their actions. 102 The careful and innocent in society will be compensated for the harms that have befallen them at the
expense of the careless.
III.

Ti

UGLY PICruR-STEPSISTER OR CINDERELLA?

So, at least at first glance, damsel generic liability looks pretty
darn good: a nice big helping of the safety I want most, with little
dollops of the wealth protection, autonomy, and justice which I would
also like the tort system to provide you. Now, however, let us assume
that the Ball has ended, leaving us with the glass slipper of "What I
Want From Tort Law?" It is time to take the harder look we must
take to be confident that the legal rules of generic liability truly are
the ones with which life will truly be "happily ever after." Just as the
Prince searched throughout the kingdom for the person whom the
glass slipper would fit, we must look very carefully at this damsel generic liability to make sure the slipper fits her. We do not want to end
3
up with an Ugly Stepsister. 10
We must, therefore, examine the theories of those who implicitly
or explicitly take issue with the idea of generic liability. Implicit are
the contractarians and the regulators, 0 4 who trust markets and governments, respectively, ahead of courts. Explicit are Professors Henderson and Twerski, who have certainly been the most influential and
comprehensive of generic liability's critics. The latter pull no punches
in portraying generic (product-category) liability as an unforgivingly
hideous stepsister, whose foot would have no chance of fitting into an
appropriately made glass slipper. If some aide were to find a way to
fit a glass slipper to her foot, they would say, the Prince and the kingdom would live far from "happily ever after."' 105

102. This is the classic negligence formulation, as expressed by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), and as adopted in sections 291293 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-293 (1977).
103. As a teacher of Family Law, I want to apologize if using the Cinderella story in this way
in any fashion perpetuates unhappy stereotypes about step relatives. I want you girls to be
aware that siblings or a parent "new" to a family are as likely to be joyous additions as are the
original models.
104. These are the short-hand terms which Professors Croley and Hanson use to describe the

market-enthusiast and more regulation-enthusiast schools of tort law's critics. See Croley &
Hanson, supra note 13, at 714-15.
105. See RESTATEMENT (TRmD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 2, Reporters' Note 66-

73, 88-97 (Tentative Draft No. 2,1995); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3.
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Things Won't Be Much Safer, If At All

At the center of my affection for generic liability is its potential to
decrease the chances that you girls, my Indonesian friends, and the
population as a whole will get hurt or killed. The critics say you and
others I care about won't get anything much in the way of safety from
imposing liability on entire categories of products, either because (1)
tort law has little or no effect on potential injurers' behavior, 0 6 or (2)
where generic liability does affect product makers' behaviors, it will
10 7
lead them to behaviors that are less safe, not more safe.
1. Tort and Deterrence
Several scholars, Stephen Sugarman most notable among them,
have questioned the conventional wisdom, articulated in Section II
above, that tort liability will deter potential injurers from unsafe behavior. 0 8 These scholars have based their attack on tort's deterrent
value on a variety of factors. They particularly point to the widespread existence of liability insurance as removing any significant
"sting" from a tort judgment. Furthermore, they point to psychological factors which make it unlikely that the unsafe behavior is changeable' 0 9 and to factors, such as ignorance or risk blindness which make
it unlikely that tort law will change unsafe behavior. They also point
to basic human decency, fear for one's own person, and government
regulation as factors which make the tort deterrent superfluous." 10
However significant such factors may be in blunting the deterrent
power of tort law in most situations, they have, virtually no significance in vitiating the safety-enhancing power of generic liability. Liability insurance certainly won't act as a barrier against liability's sting.
Many product manufacturers self-insure. Those with liability insur106. This is essentially the position of Stephen Sugarman. See SUGARMAN, supra note 54.
For other scholars who cast doubts on the deterrence value of tort judgments, see Schwartz,
supra note 44, at 381-83.
107. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1310-13.

108. See Schwartz, supra note 44, at 381-83, for a brief compilation of the writings of the
main critics. I have read and made use of the work of most of those authors. See, e.g., BELL &
O'CONNELL, supra note 50, ch. 4; Bell, supra note 43. Since, however, I do not have those works

available to me here in Indonesia, I will rely primarily on Professor Gary Schwartz's fine article,
which is with me, for citations. Schwartz's article accurately reports the main ideas of the antideterrence theorists, to the best of my recollection.
109. William Rodgers' work has highlighted the inefficacy of legal sanctions in dealing with
inadvertent, or non-conscious behavior, which makes up a sizeable portion of the negligence
which tort law will sanction. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The
Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL- L. REv. 1 (1980).

110. See Schwartz, supra note 44, at 382-83.
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ance tend to have significant deductibles and caps."' Regardless,
once generic liability is imposed on a product, the manufacturer will
pay insurance premiums which approximate the injury risks the product creates, since there will no longer be a question that it will be
liable for the injuries its product causes. The psychological obstacles
to deterrence certainly won't exist: product makers will have no difficulty noticing that their products are generically subject to liability,
and will be very alert to the likely scope of that liability. Fear for
one's own safety as a primary goad to safe behavior does not operate
for product manufacture and sale. Furthermore, the dangerous product's presence on the market demonstrates that neither manufacturer
morals nor government regulation serve to deter the dangerous
conduct.
The absence of logical obstacles to tort law's safety-enhancing
power in the generic liability context has even greater significance in
light of recent research which seems to show that even in those areas
where the logical obstacles exist, tort law still significantly deters unsafe behavior. Professor Gary Schwartz has published the most recent
comprehensive effort aimed at assessing tort law's effects on safety
behavior." 2 His conclusions rely much less on theoretical modelswhich he attempts to critique from a real-world, empirical perspective-than they do on his canvass of a multitude of empirical and
quasi-empirical" 3 studies relevant to his question: "Does tort law really deter?" Professor Schwartz concludes: "there is evidence persuasively showing that tort law achieves something significant in
encouraging safety."" 14
2. Generic Liability and the Theory of the Second Best
Thus, while there is every reason to believe that the "beautiful
picture" of generic liability as a producer of greater safety for you and
111. See id. at 385.
112. See id.
113. Among the sources of information relied on by Professor Schwartz to make some assessment of tort law's deterrent effects were several reports about the risks present in New Zealand life. As described by Schwartz, those reports seemed largely anecdotal. See id at 420-22.
While they may provide useful information-as I hope this Article's observations about condi-

tions in Indonesia will do-to style such informed observations as "empirical" seems to slight the
work of serious scholars who employ careful social science methodologies and collect carefully
selected amounts and kinds of data in efforts to test one or more clear hypotheses. I therefore
refer to such reports as "quasi-empirical."
114. Id. at 423. Professor Schwartz noted that this conclusion seemed to apply across the
board, to medical malpractice, teen and adult driving, and, of special relevance to this article,
product design. See id. at 423, 405-413.
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others survives unmarred the concerns theorists have about the law's
deterrent power in other areas of tort law, we cannot quite so quickly
conclude that generic liability is safety-lovely. On the other critical
sideline, Professors Henderson and TWerski portray generic liability as
very effective in changing behaviors, but as changing them in dramatically nasty ways. Remember that I promised you earlier in this letter
to take you to the Cave of the Henderson and Twerski. 115 Well, I
describe their writings thus because these two men-the ones most in
charge of reshaping modern products liability law in America"l 6-describe generic liability much the way I might describe a scary cave in a
story to you. They speak of it as unexplored territory, the contents of
which may look hospitable at first, but in fact are rather hideous as
you proceed further into dimly seen areas, wherein lie "market distor7
tions of gigantic proportions.""
Of course, Professors Henderson and Twerski do not in fact dip
into such Platonic similes in telling the scary story of generic liability.
Rather, they talk about such liability falling into the trap described in
the "theory of the second best.""118 In that theory, the imposition of
generic liability will unwittingly have a host of untoward effects, several of which will make life less safe for you and others. Increased
liability for products which cannot be altered to avoid that liability will
just lead to other, less safe, methods by which the demand for that
product will be satisfied. Black markets in the product will develop, in
which clandestine and financially irresponsible" 9 "hit-and-run" product makers will emerge, who make even less safe variants of the particular product. 120 Less safe used products will be used more.
2
Consumers will use products more carelessly.' '
115. See supra text accompanying note 15.
116. As Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Professors Henderson and TWerski will have been the most influential shapers of the Restatement when it is
adopted in its final form by the American Law Institute. The ALI's Restatement has been, and
seems likely to continue to be, the single most influential statement of what the law of products
liability should be.
117. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1314.
118. Id. at 1310. "Second-best" problems are those which arise when targets of expensive
government regulation (including tort liability) take actions to avoid being subject to that regulationlliability. See generally Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazardsof Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). Those actions are thought to be
counterproductive to the aims of the regulation/liability. See id.
119. "Financially irresponsible" companies are those which have few assets and little or no
insurance, so that they would basically disappear before they were able to pay anywhere near
the tort damages their products are expected to cause.

120. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1311-12.
121. See id. at 1310-14.
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Well, girls, don't necessarily believe them: it is, after all, just a
story they are telling. The Restatement Reporters and I agree that
generic liability will result in substantially higher prices. That is the
one way in which they-otherwise strikingly quiet on the topic' 22talk about the many injuries primarily attributable to these products. 123 Basic economics makes it pretty clear that except for products
universally regarded as necessities, a substantial price increase will
usually result in some significant decrease in product consumption.
That is at the heart of my conclusion that generic liability will lead to
greater safety for you.
On the other hand, the Restatement Reporters' conclusions that
these safety pressures will have all sorts of "distorted" effects are
based on pure conjecture. We all agree that days will be dark for the
handgun, cigarette, or ice cream industry if its product is found to be
generically liable. They, however, see all sorts of monsters running
around in that dark. I do not. Moreover, even if they turn out to be
right and I wrong, that is the time to change the law to account for the
monsters, not now when they are only imagined.
I challenge the monstrous visions of Professors Henderson and
Twerski in three respects. First, I do not foresee the development of
substantial "black markets" in the products judged generically liable,
in which much "clandestine" or "hit and run" production takes place.
Moreover, even if such producers did appear, the law can easily deal
with their untoward effects. Certainly, a significant increase in liability costs will encourage current and potential producers to look for
ways to avoid that liability. That is tort's deterrent effect at work. At
the same time, those liability costs will, by forcing down sales, create
considerable excess capacity in the product market. Many of these
122. They devote only two paragraphs to generic liability's positive safety effects in the 68page law review article in which they set forth most comprehensively the reasoning that has led
to their rejection of it in the Restatement drafts. See id. at 1273-74. They write those two
paragraphs in the context of strict liability for products generally. See id. In the second main

part of their article, where they discuss generic (product-category) liability directly, the Restatement Reporters devote four paragraphs (comprising two full pages) to the ways generic liability
will detract from safety, including more than a full page about how generic liability will en-

courage risky consumer behavior. See id. at 1312-13. The authors spend virtually no time on the
monstrously large numbers of injuries, illnesses, and deaths caused by the unusually dangerous
products which they recognize as likely to attract the generic liability sanction. For an author
who does notice those injuries, see Bogus, supra note 3, at 38-43, 47-48, 60-62.
123. In fact, Professors Henderson and Twerski describe the prices of products subject to
generic liability as rising "dramatically." See Henderson & Twerski, supranote 3, at 1311. Since
the courts would continue to reduce tort awards in proportion to the plaintiff's fault, the dra-

matic price rise would reflect the extent to which the product itself was primarily responsible for
injuries.
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product markets-such as those for asbestos products and aboveground swimming pools-will require sufficient capital assets for new
entrants that the opportunity for financially irresponsible new producers does not exist. Without such financial irresponsibility, new entrants will have no competitive advantage in liability costs unless they
can make themselves legally invisible to persons in the public whom
they injure. Established product makers have a completely legal way
to do that: the disclaimer process outlined in Section II.A. If some of
them, or new entrants, try to become "stealth" distributors, they will
not be able to make use of the protections from suit afforded them by
the disclaimer process. Perhaps more significantly, these stealth distributors will encounter both competitors and a substantial segment of
the consuming public eager to reveal who is behind a particular brand
of the product which begins to enjoy any significant volume of sales
(and begins to cause a significant volume of injuries). As was not the
case with Prohibition or cigarette taxes, clandestine bootleggers of
dangerous products face powerful competitors and substantial numbers of consumers whose radar is constantly sweeping the market to
locate them. 124 If the worst comes to pass, and some substantial share
of some generically liable product becomes supplied by unsafe hitand-run producers, the government can simply require that product to
bear a label giving its manufacturer and its American business address
before any distributor can sell it to the public. A couple of well-publicized prosecutions of retailers under such a law would quickly drive
up the costs of clandestine hit-and-run producers to the point where
they would not be competitive with the legitimate, in-the-open
125
producers.
124. The Restatement Reporters rely on the examples of Prohibition (when the product

could not be legally sold, period) and cigarette-bootlegging between states with substantially
different tax rates to boost their claims that there would be substantial black-marketeers able to
evade liability. See id. In neither of those instances was the black-marketeering cutting into any

company's market share. In neither of those instances were the buyers of the product likely to

have an interest in pointing the black-marketeer out to the authorities, as would injured persons,
their friends and relatives, and any member of the public likely to respond to a "reward" offered
by plaintiffs' lawyers for such information. Where both conditions exist, as with generic liability,

"stealth" producers better have a more impressive distribution technology than any I can imagine if they really wish to remain undetected. And, if they do have such a technology, their antidetection costs are likely to be so high that they will eventually be unable to compete against the
legitimate manufacturers who can avoid liability costs with respect to many sales by using the

disclaimer process.
125. The black-marketeers about whom Henderson and TWerski write would have to be both
clandestine and hit-and-run (financially irresponsible). Because it is making a product which is
by definition both likely to cause and be liable for accidents, any manufacturer will face substantial tort damages. Without resources, the hit-and-run product maker will go under pretty

quickly, unless it cannot be found. As the text and previous footnote explain, hiding will not be
easy where there are so many seekers.

1996]

GENERIC LIABILITY

Second, while I agree that there may be some increase in the
length of use of some of these very dangerous products which were
purchased before the generic liability ruling, I do not worry about the
increased danger therefrom. Many of the products most often mentioned as candidates for generic liabiity-cigarettes, alcohol, even ice
cream-do not have a long life. Some of those which might have a
longer life-such as handguns and bullets-may in fact be safer as
they age, rather than more dangerous. Advances in gun technology
seem to make them more efficient for killing, which should more than
offset any increase in safety to the gun-wielder. Should generic liability be applied to any durables other than above-ground swimming
pools, 126 there is the possibility that such products will be used longer
than they would otherwise have been, and will, as a result, cause some
injuries that a new pool would not have caused. Any increase in injuries from this cause seems likely to be small, and likely to be infinitesimal in comparison to the lives saved and injuries avoided because
fewer such dangerous products are bought and/or because safer substitutes are developed.
Finally, while I agree with the Henderson and Twerski analysis
that under a generic liability system product users and consumers will
bear accident costs less closely in relation to their amounts of product
usage, 127 I do not expect that to make any significant difference in
your or others' safety. Regarding product safety, what the Restatement Reporters are saying, to the best of my understanding, is that
126. Carl Bogus has suggested escalators as a possible subject of generic liability. See Bogus,
supra note 3, at 37-38, 38 n.156 (reporting one case). None of the other authors I have read have
mentioned other products, although the authors of the new Restatement give the appearance of
having signed on to generic liability for exploding cigars, at least if they inherently produce
enough heat to ignite facial hair. See RESTATEMENr (TIaRn) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILrY
§ 2 illus. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
127. See Henderson & TWerski, supra note 3, at 1312-13. According to their analysis, if a
product maker is held liable, the cost of the injuries resulting from an accident ends up being
reflected in the price of the product(s) it makes and sells. When consumers and users buy the
product, they pay the tort costs (and the tort "insurance") on a per-product basis. In other
words, each consumer more or less pays the same price for the product. In theory, a consumer/
user who uses the product more often than another has a higher risk of being injured by the
product. Yet, having paid for whatever insurance against injury tort law provides when s/he
bought the product, the consumer/user supposedly has no incentive to moderate use of the product. If there were no product liability, the consumer/user supposedly would find an incentive to
use the product less in the risk that s/he would not receive tort compensation if it injured him or
her.
Because the authors also speak of this state of affairs as a fairness concern, see id. at 1313;
see also RESTATEMENT (TrmnR) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a, at 15 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995), I am unclear if they mean seriously to suggest that generic liability is likely to
contribute to greater danger by encouraging greater use of products which are dangerous to
their users (the only situations in which the above analysis is operative).
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people will use products more often-albeit no less carefully, since
generic liability doesn't help them if they use the product carelesslyif those products are subject to generic liability, because they can be
confident of being compensated by the tort system if they get hurt.
Well, there may indeed be some people out there in the world who
will be motivated to use a product more often than they otherwise
would by the knowledge that compensation is coming their way if they
are seriously injured. May be. 128 Realistically, whatever number of
such persons exist will be small in comparison to those who use the
product less as a result of the publicity about the product's danger that
comes with a trial about and finding of generic liability. Even that
larger group will be quite a bit smaller, I expect, than the group that
ceases to use the product altogether upon a finding of generic liability
due to the product's unavailability, increased cost, or more widely
known risks.
While I thus conclude that the scary "second-best" tales spun by
the Restatement Reporters are quite unlikely to be true, I recognize
that I cannot be completely sure. Were their story of generic liability's
distortions to come true, the doctrine would need reevaluation. There
is, of course, only one way to find out who is right: permit generic
liability. If the doctrine is permitted, there are places along the way to
avoid the "distortions." Defendants will have the opportunity to present the three-judge court with evidence from experts in the market
structures and economics of the industry whose product is being challenged. Such experts will help the judges determine if any significant
distortion effects are likely to occur if generic liability is imposed on
the particular product.' 2 9 Then, of course, if generic liability is imposed on the product, those experts and all of us theorists will have
128. I confess to skepticism about the widespread existence of a kind of thinking which: (a)
actually focuses on the dangers of injury associated with a product-a use-deterring focus - and
(b) then thinks about the tort system-a system that gives me, at least, the shivers when I think
about being a plaintiff therein-and then (c) decides that the chances of getting adequate money
from the tort system if he is injured are so good that he is going to go out and use that product
even more than he had originally planned.
129. Such evidence about possible distortion effects would be relevant to the core risk-utility
balancing the court must do because part of a product's utility consists of the risks that do not
exist as a result of its place in the market. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 118. The risk-utility
analysis for ice cream should include the risky activities or foodstuffs which ice cream's presence
on the market displaces. Including such factors in the risk-utility calculus will make the court's
decisionmaking even more difficult. However, if the Restatement Reporters believe it is too
difficult for a court to consider these factors in the context of a particular product and with the
help of experts knowledgeable about the industry and its market, then the Reporters should
certainly acknowledge their own incompetence to make any such judgments about products with
no expert help. It would be odd for the American Law Institute in its Restatement to foreclose
even the possibility of generic liability on the basis of unexamined hunches about distortion
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the chance to gather data that would show us whether distortion effects result and what they are. That would seem to be the appropriate
time to abandon generic liability-at least for that product or kind of
product. Should such distortion effects occur as the Restatement Reporters speculate, we can feel confident that Congress will waste little
130
time overturning the generic liability finding.
B. We Will Pay Too Much for What We Want.
If generic liability gives you safer products, as I think it will, that
would be great. I would be happy. Happy, that is, unless I found out
that you could get the same amount of safety at a place down the
street for half the price. 13 ' But this, claim some contractarian theorists about products liability, 132 is precisely what would be going on in
the absence of tort liability. Producers would provide the levels of
safety people really wanted, levels they were willing to pay for, without having to pay the huge costs gouged out of them by the tort sys133
tem just to process claims for compensation for defective products.
Producers would provide warranties, promising the levels of safety
people wanted.
While this line of argument applies to all rules of liability for defective products, the contractarians would point out that it is especially appropriate with respect to the products subject to generic
liability. There, product distributors are already providing the level of
safety people want. After all, they would ask, is there anyone around
who is unaware of the grave dangers of cigarettes, handguns, or asbestos products? Ice cream? Well, they would say, if it were really suffieffects, when those possible distortion effects could be examined much more rigorously and realistically if generic liability were allowed to proceed.
130. The Restatement Reporters are well aware of legislatures' willingness to revoke court
findings of generic liability. See RESTATEMENT (TmD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY Re-

porters' Note at 96 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
131. I am perhaps more conscious than usual of this "rip-off" effect in our purchases this
year. It is common in Central Java for Indonesian friends and acquaintances to ask us how much
we paid whenever they see us with something new. Not surprisingly, when we tell them honestly

what we paid, they commonly respond with a knowing, "you paid too much," sometimes followed by a precise accounting of what they or their friends paid for the same product. We are
ever conscious that we are being charged "foreigner" prices for things. We try hard to bargain
that down to "basic foreigner" price levels as opposed to "rich, stupid, tourist foreigner" prices.
Regardless, we are very attuned to the possibility that others are getting the same thing we are,
and paying substantially less for it.

132. The best recent collection I have found of contractarian thought on this point is in Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 714-35.
133. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
TORT LrIIOATION (1986); Saks, supra note 70, at 1282 (of dollars spent in auto and non-auto tort
litigation, the plaintiffs received 52% and 43%, respectively).
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ciently dangerous to become a realistic candidate for generic liability,
people would know about the danger. If people wanted insurance-in
the form of a warranty-against being injured by the product, and
were willing to pay for it, the manufacturers would gladly give it to
them. Who needs tort law?
Nice try, contractarians. Looks good on paper, but it just doesn't
work that way in real life. Impressed as I am with the value of autonomy which underlies most of the contractarian work, 134 I do not expect product sales contracts to give you girls the nature and amount of
personal injury protection you really want. One reason I don't expect
that is because it has not seemed to happen. Before the 1960s, when
product distributors generally had the legal right to refuse to provide
insurance to consumers for product-related injuries, all manufacturers
disclaimed any liability for personal injuries in their warranties. 135 In
fact, those products which are very dangerous, but for which manufacturers have not been held liable-like cigarettes-still do not offer
any warranty or other protection to their consumers for some increase
in price. 136
Other reasons I do not expect product sales contracts to provide
desired safety are more structural. Because of the costs of obtaining
and processing information regarding risks during product purchases,
many consumers do not become informed either of the dangers inherent in a product or of the protections offered or withdrawn in a warranty. 37 Because many consumers already have some form of firstparty insurance, they will not demand efficient warranties or efficient
134. Remember, my principal analytical approach in this article seeks to determine the
proper legal rule for inherently too-dangerous products by asking what rule the loving parents of
product consumers/users would choose. See supra notes 22, 32-41 and accompanying text. Remember also that by recommending a process by which a product distributor can validly disclaim
responsibility for product injuries, see supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text, I ultimately
permit buyers and sellers to handle risks of personal injury by contract.
135. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 727.
136. Contractarians could argue that this reflects the fact that no consumer wants such "insurance." I find it hard to believe that no significant group of smokers would like to be insured
against the risk that they will be disabled because of smoking. Contractarians could respond that
there probably are such persons, but that the costs of contracting with them about protection
against personal injury in the context of cigarette sales are too great for such "warranties" to
occur. Given that for products which are bought repetitively, the manufacturer could sell such
"insurance" against all cigarette-related injuries in one transaction, contracting costs should not
be so high as to prohibit all such agreements if product makers truly were willing to supply them.
137. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 770-79 (information costs prevent consumers
from knowing warranty terms and from estimating risks well); Latin, supra note 37, at 1227-45
(offering various psychological reasons people do not understand or act on warnings of danger,
several of which reasons would also apply to make people unlikely to purchase, before an accident, the level of safety and insurance they really want).
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levels of product safety. 138 Because manufacturers are most senstive
to their marginal consumers and those marginal consumers tend to
demand less in the way of warranty provisions and investments in
safety than do average consumers, product makers will tend to underestimate the amount of safety and insurance that consumers really
9
want. 13
While contractarian arguments at least make sense-even if ultimately they are not persuasive-in the context of consumers, they fall
flat when applied to the substantial number of bystander injuries.
People who are the victims of another consumer's handgun, cigarette
smoke, or drinking cannot buy the safety and insurance they want in
the market because they are not making contracts with the product
distributors at all. Knowing very little about her risk of harm from
many of the products that are prime candidates for generic liability,
the potential bystander victim's costs of contracting with the manufacturers who create risks to her are prohibitively high.
In short, the levels of safety, insurance, and justice which you can
get from generic liability do not really seem to be available to you for
a price you are willing to pay. For the time being, the market should
wait on the imposition of generic liability. Once it is established, if it
is not what some people really want, they can turn to the market to
modify it through the disclaimer process described in Section II.A
40
above.'
C. Courts Should Not Make These Decisions: The Polycentric
Puddle
Despite the wide variety of difficulties the Restatement Reporters see in a product world with generic liability, their opposition to
generic liability in the end hinges on their judgment that courts simply
cannot do the job of weighing a product's social costs against its social
benefits. They picture generic liability as an unseaworthy doctrinal
ship which "surely would founder" upon "the shoal" of "polycentric"
138. For a fuller explanation of how consumers' first-party insurance leads to this result of
encouraging manufacturers to "write one-sided warranties and produce inefficiently unsafe
products," see Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 785-86.
139. See id. at 779-81.
140. When the disclaimer process is put into practice, the state-employed consumer counsellors would do well to familiarize themselves with Professor Howard Latin's impressive list and
description of factors which get in the way of people's abilities to process information about
product-created risks. See Latin, supra note 37.
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decisionmaking. 141 In other words, courts are so poorly equipped to
make the kinds of gross risk-utility decisions about products which
generic liability would require that the doctine will be unworkable.
No one should be surprised that this is where the Restatement
Reporters make their stand against generic liability. More than any
tort scholar of the past quarter century, Professor Henderson has focused on the nature of judge/jury decisionmaking as a key factor in
choices among legal rules. 142 Moreover, in arguing for real strict liability for manufacturing defects in the new Restatement, the authors
begin the substantive sections of that document by accepting many of
the rationales for products liability rules that apply equally in favor of
generic liability: safety enhancement through increased product
prices, fairness in holding manufacturers liable for deliberate choices
in favor of inflicting injury, and fairness in requiring consumers who
get the benefits of products without being harmed to share those
products' unavoidable injury costs. 143 If products liability can achieve
all these ends, then opposition to it in the context of especially dangerous products must be founded elsewhere.
The essence of the polycentrism argument-that courts are not
suited to the making of decisions which involve the weighing of complex interrelated factors'"4-would, if widely accepted, force courts to
141. Henderson & TWerski, supra note 3, at 1305 (emphasis added). The authors signal at
the outset of their article that this is their central objection to generic liability, as well as to
"across-the-board" strict products liability:
[L]iability without defect never will become part of the products liability mainstream.
Our pessimism stems not from the fact that liability without defect is politically unacceptable .... Rather, we demonstrate that defect is the conceptual linchpin that holds
products liability law together; a system of liability without defect is beyond the capacity of the courts to implement.
Id. at 1267. The authors regard imposing generic liability as a form of imposing liability without
defect.
142. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson,
JudicialReview]; James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraintsin Torts, 67 CORNLL L. REV. 901

(1982).
143. See RESTATEMENT (Tmina) OF TORTS: PRODUCs LIABILrry § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
144. Henderson and Twerski do not explain the notion of polycentricity to any great extent
in their article attacking the concept of generic (product-category) liability. See Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 3, at 1305. However, in his initial prominent piece on the subject, Professor
Henderson described polycentric decisions as those in which a decisionmaker must place "relative values upon a multitude of factors. The decisions he must make regarding those factors are
as interrelated and interdependent as the strands of an intricate web." Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 142, at 1540. Henderson sees courts' decisionmaking in these polycentric contexts as subverting the judicial process, because litigants would be reduced to making speeches
instead of their traditional roles of offering proofs and arguments for a decision according to law.
See id. Dealing with polycentric problems, "the adjudicative process would become nothing
more than an elaborate masquerade." Id.
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abandon most of the role they have played in the common law of tort
for the past century. One need not have advanced beyond the basic
first-year Torts course to recognize that courts make essentially the
same decision whenever they hear a negligence case that they are
making in deciding a generic liability claim. Listen to the basic Restatement formulation of negligence:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as
involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the
act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what
the law regards as the
145 utility of the act or of the particular manner
in which it is done.
In Professor Henderson's Torts casebook, he or his coauthor comments that:
The balancing of costs and benefits suggested by Learned Hand in
Carroll Towing has come to be recognized as the core question in
determining whether an actor has been negligent. 1'
Professor Henderson, at least, is not unaware that the basic negligence
rules fit uncomfortably snugly into his notion of polycentrism. In his
most detailed explanation of that concept, he noted the lack of meaningful decisional guidelines in the standard of reasonable care, suggested that the "reasonable man" instruction and the jury had
submerged that polycentrism, and concluded:
Nonetheless, the administration of the negligence concept over the
last one hundred years is ultimately consistent with my hypothesis,
for it must be conceded that it has 147
been accomplished only with
notable signs of strain and difficulty.
While Professor Henderson did not, of course, condemn the courts in
that article for making negligence decisions, he did then (in 1973) condemn the courts for ruling on claims in products liability cases involving conscious design defects. 148 Having twenty years more of
experience with courts managing quite-nicely-thank-you with the adjudication of such design defects, Professor Henderson now admits
145. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965). The Restatement explains in the next
two sections some of the factors which courts must consider in doing this risk-utility balancing.
In determining the utility of an actor's conduct, the court must look at the social value of the
interests being advanced, the extent of the chance that the action challenged as negligent will
advance that interest, and the extent of the chance that the interests can be advanced by less
dangerous conduct. See id. § 292. In determining the magnitude of the risk, the court must
attend to: the social value which the law attaches to the interests imperilled by the actor's conduct; the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will invade the interests of others; the
extent of the harm likely to be caused; and the number of persons likely to be harmed. See id.
§ 293.
146. JAMEs A. HENDERSON, JR., ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 204-05 (4th ed. 1994).
147. Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 142, at 1541-42.
148. See id. at 1539-42.
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that those risk-utility balancing decisions are not "too" polycentric,
149
and authors the Restatement section which tells courts to go ahead.
Negligence and design defect cases are hardly the only paths of
"polycentrism" the courts regularly walk. The doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities (ADA strict liability) requires
courts to weigh a host of factors in order to decide whether an entire
activity-such as blasting, transporting gasoline in tanker trucks, or
manufacturing and shipping a dangerous chemical-is abnormally
dangerous. 50 This seems the same sort of decision for activities that
generic liability entails for products. The Henderson Torts casebook
refers at length to the idea that this venerable pocket of strict liability
in tort law can also be understood as a determination of negligence
(risks greater than utility, remember) at the "activity level.' 51 Given
these striking similarities, it is somewhat surprising that the Reporters
ignore ADA strict liability when they discuss generic liability's too52
great polycentrism.1
I confess I hate having these public disagreements with Professor
Henderson about whether a particular kind of legal decision is too
"polycentric" for courts to make. In one of the earliest articles of my
academic career 53 I found myself disagreeing with him on precisely
these grounds in arguing for tort recovery for emotional distress damages. My arguments then were a lot like my argument here: "You say
OF TORTS: PRODUCTs LIABILrY § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
149. See RESTATEMENT (TrD)
1995); Henderson & TWerski, supra note 3, at 1305 n.154. Professor Henderson's switch of position on courts' competence to decide conscious design defect cases, in conjunction with his comments about negligence quoted above, make me suspect that he would have likewise condemned
negligence on grounds of polycentrism had he been writing when that doctrine was new.
150. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977). Section 520 states:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are
to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattel of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriatness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id. § 520.
151. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 146, at 554-55.
152. The Reporters, of course, are aware of the doctrine. They discuss it in one section of
their primary writing about generic liability, but do so in the context of explaining how the
doctrine has been reserved for activities, rather than for products and why that makes sense. See
RESTATEMENT (TmIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. a, at 48 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). Nowhere do
they even mention that the kinds of decisions courts are making in strict liability about the
liability of an entire category of activity involve the same kinds of "polycentrism" that would
accompany a decision about the liability of an entire category of product.
153. See Bell, Bell Tolls, supra note 9, at 379-80.
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courts are unsuited to make this kind of decision, but, look, look at all
those kinds of decisions you are perfectly willing to have them make,
which are essentially the same at this kind." Now, that is a somewhat
unsatisfactory kind of argument, because I suspect that Professor
Henderson might in turn say "those kinds of decisions are polycentric,
too," or "those kind of decisions are polycentric, too, but not fatally
so." However, it is difficult to make any different argument against
the Henderson designation of a category of cases as polycentric, because it is virtually impossible (at least for me 154 ) to define which decisions are polycentric, and which are not, and which have a "degree
of," but not too much polycentricity. That is not exactly a shock,
given his definition of polycentric problems:
They consist of elements that are connected to one another as are
the strands of a spider's web, so that a decision with regard
155to any
element affects the decisions with regard to all the others.
Without any clearer standard by which to decide which court decisions
are polycentric, or too polycentric, and which are not, I have trouble
fashioning the argument that generic liability decisions are not
polycentric. Oddly, by the very amorphousness of the concept he uses
Professor Henderson probably gives me a better feel for the difficulties in what he speaks of as polycentrism. I understand it better as the
difficulty of working with legal standards about which I am very
unclear.
Regardless of what polycentrism might mean to others, and in
other situations, it hardly has any particular applicability to the core
generic liability situation. The standard for liability is very clear: "Do
the product's risks as designed outweigh its social utility?" Lawyers
can present evidence and structure proof to meet this standard. They
confront it all the time in the negligence, products liability, and strict
liability cases referred to above. If a defendant ice cream manufacturer can present evidence to a court showing that the social utility of
ice cream outweighs its risks-a conclusion towards which the court
154. Me, that is, having sought assistance in the writings of others who I have at times hoped
might aid me to understand more clearly the concept that is at the center of so much of Professor
Henderson's writing about tort. I have sought such assistance in vain.
155. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1305. In his germinal article articulating the
polycentric critique of products liability law, Professor Henderson expounded at greater length
on the concept, giving examples which included a football coach's line-up decisions. See Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 142, at 1534-42. He did not, however, define the concept
more clearly there, other than to note that polycentric problems created participation difficulties
for litigants because their lawyers would not be able to address themselves to one issue at a time,
independent of the others, with some claim that the facts of their case entitled them to a decision
in their favor on each of those issues. See id. at 1535-36.
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will lean because of its long familiarity with the challenged productthe manufacturer will win the case. Its lawyer can present evidence
seriatim: first on the risks versus utility issue, then on the causation
issue, 156 then on any defense issues, and then on damages.
The Restatement Reporters have decided, however, that this riskutility balancing becomes too polycentric once a plaintiff is not claiming that the product would have been fine with a particular alternate
design. In fact, evidence about the benefits and risks of a vehicle without a roll bar as opposed to the same vehicle with a roll bar is much
less likely to be available than is evidence about the risks, and even
the utility, of an entire product line, such as handguns. Lawyers have
a hope of accessing data about, or experts familiar with, the harms
done nationally by handguns, the numbers of them in circulation, and
the benefits which their users enjoy. Similar data is unlikely ever to
have been compiled about particular aspects of a product, such as a
particular kind of handgun safety catch, as opposed another kind of
safety.
Admittedly, the decision about whether the inherent risks of a
product outweigh its inherent utility often will not be an easy one.
The three-judge court will likely be presented with a tremendous
amount of evidence. Yet lawyers will structure that presentation to
make it comprehensible in the framework of the risk-utility balance.
That is their job, as it has been the job of lawyers in complex civil and
criminal cases for decades. Unlike judges in design defect cases, the
judges in generic liability cases will not have to imagine the risks and
utility of some proposed alternate design that has never existed. They
will simply be able to look at the product that exists and, in all
probability has existed for a long time, leaving a considerable trail of
evidence as to its social costs and benefits.' 5 7 The experienced trial
judges who will be hearing a generic liability case as part of the special
court I propose will have had substantial experience in other tort liti156. Did the product, for example, the ice cream, cause the injuries/illness about which the

plaintiff complains? Occasionally, in cases where questions arise about the foreseeability of the
plaintiff's injuries, about the bizarre way those injuries came about, or about intervening causes,
the lawyers may also need to address the issue of proximate, or legal, cause. The standards for
determining proximate cause would seem to qualify for Hendersonian condemnation as polycentric if any would. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-33 (1977) (discussing how

courts can determine "legal cause").
157. When Professors Henderson and TWerski consider how parties would attempt to prove

a generic liability claim, they present a picture of a case in which the claimant is not even clear
what product s/he is attacking-a mistake a competent trial lawyer is not going to make-and in
which the claimant has to struggle with issues about the extent of the product liability in the face
of an intervening cause. See Henderson & TWerski, supra note 3, at 1280-82. The picture
painted here of proof at a trial on the core risk-utility balancing issue seems more realistic.
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gation with the difficulty of weighing harm to health and life against
human pleasures in using or eating the product. While all these factors will not make the generic liability decision easy, they do suggest
that the group of judges would be operating well within their traditional competence when making that decision.
In the end, as with any human decision, it is possible that the
judges will get it wrong. They may decide the product's risks outweigh its social benefits, when it is really the other way around. We
will never know that they were wrong-or that they were right-there
being no agreed-on measure of risk, or of utility. The only situation in
which we can be confident that the courts will get it wrong is if they
refuse to decide any of the generic liability claims. Then, some products will escape liability, and thus be treated as though their benefits
were greater than their risks, even where their risks outweigh their
social benefits. Of course, that is what the Restatement Reporters
would have the courts do.
Not only would the Restatement position thus assure error in the
risk-utility weighing, but it would also assure that the courts err in the
direction that is least likely to be corrected by other institutions. If a
court imposes generic liability on a product whose benefits in fact exceed its risks there are two correctives: first, as the Reporters themselves point out, 15 8 legislatures have very reliably stepped in to correct

such court findings in the past; second, the market itself will repair the
error. Products held generically liable will merely bear the costs of
some of the accidents they cause. When their price goes up, reflecting
this inceased liability, those products will still be worth their cost to
most people, because those people will be getting more benefit from
59
the product than its risks, as reflected in its costs.'

1. Other Institutions Will Do It Better
While somewhat lonely in their insistence on "polycentrism" as a
reason for courts to cease trying to make certain decisions, the Restatement Reporters are by no means alone in making the related
158. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1315, 1318; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
96 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
159. Supposedly, in the market, people will pay for a good so long as they get more from the
product than it costs them. If there are market imperfections which prevent products from being
able to capture their full benefits by being priced higher, the government can always provide the
product a subsidy, which will reflect the extent to which the product's social benefits exceed its
benefits which can be reflected in its price.
These corrective forces are backstopped even further in the proposal I make in this article
by the disclaimer process.
OF ToRTs: PRODUCrS LIABILITY
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claim that administrative agencies will do a better job of giving us
what we want than will court-administered tort law. 160 They emphasize, however, that the legislature also will deal better with the issues
posed by inherently dangerous products, 161 in part because "the risks
identified by product-category liability claims are highly visible and
relatively few in number.'162
Professors Henderson and Twerski seem to have firmly fixed in
their minds the classical social studies model of the legislative or administrative processes, burned into my mind in high school in the
1960s. In that model, legislatures hold extensive hearings on such
things as the dangers of cigarettes or handguns, listen to a full range of
expertise on the matter, deliberate carefully how best to deal with the
problems they have uncovered, and then enact legislation suitably tailored to protect the legitimate interests involved. Administrative
agencies can behave similarly, except they have "experts" in the relevant area doing the information gathering and evaluation job.
Modem legislative proceedings, at least as far as tort matters are
concerned, bear about as much resemblance to this classic model as a
Westminster Kennel Club show champion bears to a junkyard dog.
One need look no further than last year's efforts at tort reform in the
United States House of Representatives to recognize how the world
has changed. Major tort reform legislation was passed by the House
mere months after it was introduced. Various medical and business
groups added themselves to the special protections being afforded
products distributors via floor amendments that never even received
committee attention. 163 Or, look at the forty-plus legislatures which
passed Good Samaritan legislation fifteen to twenty years ago, protecting doctors from tort liability for emergency treatments administered in public places, at a time when the federal government's health
160. See authorities collected in Lyndon, supra note 94, at 138 n.1.

161. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1306-08, 1330-31.
162. Id. at 1331.

163. Aware that Americans were not enamored of the tort system, the House Republican
leadership included provisions promising tort reform in their "Contract With America" that
formed the basis for much of their success in the 1994 midterm elections. As soon as the new
Congress convened, with its first Republican majority in nearly three decades, the Republican
leadership pushed hurry-up action on that tort reform, along with many of the other provisions
of its "Contract." While the legislation which finally emerged from a House-Senate Conference
was much closer to the products liability reform which had been under longer consideration by
the Senate, see Martha M. Hamilton, Conferees Agree on Limits To Product Liability Awards;
Judges Would be Able to Override Caps, WASH. PosT, Mar. 14, 1996, at A1, the precipitous
actions by the House of Representatives, a body with much greater resources and a much longer
deliberative tradition than state legislatures, indicates that old models may not be applicable in
the context of the newly politicized tort law of the late twentieth century.
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agency could not find a single case in which a doctor had been successfully sued in such circumstances. 164 More recent models of the administrative process portray agencies as "captured" by the interests they
regulate, or as especially sensitive to political winds and interest group
65
pressures.
In the matter of legislative or administrative decisions about the
merits of a product's continued presence on the market, the interests
of potential victims will be like a house of straw in the face of the Big
Bad Wolf huffing and puffing. The interests threatened by a ban on a
product category are those of wealthy and politically powerful corporations, who will be aware of the stakes involved in the agency or legislative determination and who will marshall their considerable
lobbying and financial resources to fight a ban. The interests of the
public who will be exposed to the dangerous product will not be so
forcefully represented. The exposed public will not know that their
interests are at stake: most, rightfully, will believe they are not going
to be hurt by the product in question. The majority of people with an
above-average interest in products considered for a ban will be those
who buy them, who have already decided that they want the products.
Plaintiffs' trial lawyers, a group who have provided the most organized lobbying force on the side of potential injury victims in many
legislative battles, will have few of the same incentives to spend their
resources in seeking a product ban, given that such legislative action
would merely deprive them of a source of future income.
Evidence will be presented in legislative or administrative hearings, of course. However, those who oppose the product's continued
existence will not be able to use pretrial discovery to collect much of
the evidence about the product that is in the hands of its manufacturer. The evidence will not be presented under oath. Witnesses will
not be subject to cross-examination by carefully prepared attorneys.
No person or group of persons will be in charge of coordinating the
presentation of evidence to the administrative or legislative body, nor
will anyone coordinate rebuttal of the evidence. In the legislature, the
decisionmakers may hear some, little, or none of the evidence. The
administrator may be so swamped by repetitive submissions that s/he
has to ignore many.
More acute minds than mine have grappled witlU the question of
whether administrative agencies and legislatures do a better job of
164. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 43, at 983.

165. See, e.g.,

PERCIVAL ET AL.,

supra note 34, at 187-90.
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regulating dangers in our society than do courts. 166 There is certainly
no scholarly consensus either that administrative bodies should replace courts, or vice versa, with respect to dealing with product or
other dangers. Because of the way in which I think evidence will be
presented and listened to in the special generic liability court, I prefer
it to legislatures and administrative agencies as an information-gathering and information-evaluation system in the context of the decision
about generic liability. I also prefer it as a decision-making systemover the legislature, because we are more likely to get a decision on
the merits of the risk versus utility balancing from the court, so that if
a product is more dangerous to you girls than it is beneficial, you have
a chance to get some protection from it. I prefer the court over the
administrative agencies because the judges will be much more free
from the influences that parties with political power, money, and
ongoing relationships with the agency can bring to the decisionmaking
process. I do not say administrative agencies are incompetent to
make the risk-utility comparisons that the generic liability court would
make. I just say that the courts are competent, too, perhaps even
more competent in this area.
Finally, on this point as well, allowing courts to make the generic
liability decision leaves the system with a safety valve. If the legislature, the elected articulators of the public will, anathematize a court
decision imposing generic liability, it has the power to overrule that
decision. The legislature is also likely to have the political will. It is
much more likely to address the merits of the issue if a court holds a
product generically liable than if the courts never deal with the
issue.167

2.

Insurmountable Problems With Other Tort Issues

In a final, almost reflexive, challenge to courts' competence to
make the generic liability decision, Professors Henderson and Twerski
166. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 3, at 65-86 (discussing, with a rich set of anecdotes, some of
the failings of legislative and administrative systems in dealing with dangerous products, and
linking the stories to the issue of institutional competence); Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at
743-58 (discussing work of the "regulators," W. Kip Viscusi, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Stephen Sugarman on administrative versus tort solutions to product dangers); Lyndon, supra note
94, at 156-70 (discussing relative strengths and weaknesses of courts and regulators in dealing

with the risks of techn 1ogy).
167. The balance of political power on most generic liability issues is likely to be such that an
industry whose product is declared generically liable should be able to get a fairly rapid hearing

in the Congress. Such rapid hearings have frequently followed court decisions holding powerful
forces liable. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILxTY 94-96 (Tentative

Draft No. 2, 1995); Bogus, supra note 3, at 44-46.
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claim that the doctrine's adoption would create significant problems
for courts trying to resolve issues of contributory fault, useful product
life, and causation. 168 While these issues may be problematic for
courts if they adopt the across-the-board strict liability that those authors were also addressing in their principal attack on generic liability,169 they deserve short shrift as obstacles to the adoption of generic
liability because the basic issues should be no more nor less difficult
than in the context of traditional design defect litigation.
Other than an unsubstantiated worry about judicial nullification, 170 the Restatement Reporters' worry in regard to issues of plaintiff fault is that courts will have a harder time knowing how much
plaintiff foolishness to forgive. 17' It may be true that some traditional
design defect cases-particularly those involving products allegedly
unsafe because they did not protect against anticipated consumer/user
foolishness-make the decision about how much plaintiff foolishness
to forgive relatively easy. However, plenty of traditional products liability cases-such as those challenging the crashworthiness of cars and
poorly designed tampons, kayaks, or hot coffee-do not make that
decision any easier than in a generic liability case. Courts are accustomed to comparing "bad" manufacturer conduct with "bad" plaintiff
conduct across a fascinating range of product cases.
With respect to the issue of useful product life, the Reporters
worry that producers will be liable beyond the product's useful life. 172
They offer the collapse of an aged above-ground swimming pool as an
example; yet, it seems unlikely that generic liability would even apply
in that example, since the dangers which make such pools inherently
too risky do not include the danger of metal fatigue. 173 The real question posed by this issue is how long manufacturers should be responsible for injuries caused by their products. The reasons to cut off
manufacturer liability after a certain time-as, for example, a statute
168. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1301-05.
169. See id. at 1276-87. Those problems may not be all that significant even if that context.
See Geistfeld, supra note 47, at 1162-69.
170. The authors surmise that once a court finds that the product's risks outweigh its benefits, it may be "tempted to conclude that the plaintiff's fault should play no role at all." Henderson & TWerski, supra note 3, at 1301. In the face of long-standing judicial practice of applying
comparative fault in products liability cases, many of which will have involved far more blameworthy manufacturer conduct than the mere offering of a familiarly dangerous product for sale,
this surmise seems groundless.
171. See id. at 1301-02.
172. See id. at 1302.
173. See Geistfeld, supra note 47, at 1162-64 (explaining how traditional proximate cause
analysis would limit a manufacturer's liability to those risks which made the product subject to
liability in the first place).
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of repose would do-or to continue that liablity for the foreseeable
life of the product, or for its whole life, continue to be valid whether
the design defect arises out of the failure to use an alternate
design or
174
design.
possible
only
the
of
danger
out of the inherent
With respect to causation, Professors Henderson and Twerski
raise a number of worries about verifiability, multiple causation, and
proximate cause, at least one of which they admit could be solved
through the application of traditional legal concepts. 175 Professor
Mark Geistfeld thoroughly met those worries in a brief response to
the Reporters' principal article. 176
D. An Unfair Turn
At first blush, generic liability looks like a paragon of corrective
justice. Innocent injured consumers, users, and bystanders 177 recover
for the harm inflicted on them by the unreasonable behavior of a
product distributor, a product distributor who has subjected all of us
to unusually grave danger. 178 While distributively less neat, 179 even
that aspect of justice gets better service from generic liability than it
does from most of the rest of tort law.
Nevertheless, Professors Henderson and Twerski still see Ugly
Stepsister written all over generic liability. The doctrine operates unfairly, they claim, because it forces "careful" product users to subsidize "careless" ones. Generic liability does this, they say, by allowing
the careless injured to collect tort damages that the careful never get a
shot at even though they, too, pay the freight.' 80 In addition, accord174. See id. at 1168-69.
175. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1303-04. The authors admit that the proximate cause worry would be taken care of simply by having liability be determined by the scope
of the risks which made the court hold the defendant's product generically liable in the first
place. See id. at 1304. Yet, with no apparent reason, the authors say "[s]uch analysis would be
difficult nonetheless." Id. at 1305. That conclusion seems surprising, given that courts regularly

decide proximate cause issues that way. See Geistfeld, supra note 47, at 1163.
176. See Geistfeld, supra note 47, at 1162-66.

177. If they are not innocent, they will have their recovery reduced according to their comparative fault. See RESTATEMENT (TmiRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABiLrry § 12, at 300-05 (Ten-

tative Draft No. 2, 1995).
178. Behavior in marketing a product whose social risks outweigh its social
generally be regarded as unreasonable. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
(1965).
179. See discussion infra Part III.D.1.
180. See RESTATEMENT (TI-RD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. a, at
tive Draft No. 2, 1995). The drafters explain their view that product risks in

utility would
TORTS § 291
15-16 (Tentaa reasonably

designed product appropriately are transferred to product users that are "in a better position
than the manufacturer to manage those risks efficiently." Id. at 16. It is in the context of consumers and users bearing responsibility for such proper product use that the authors worry about
the careful users subsidizing the careless.
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ing to Henderson and TWerski, even among the careful users those
who use the dangerous product less frequently in a sense subsidize
those who use the product more frequently. 181 Both groups pay the
same price for the product, but the product's price under generic liability reflects the greater amount of injury generated by those who
make more frequent use of it.
There are some difficulties even with these claims of unfairness
through forced subsidies. The careless users will not be in a better
position than the careful, for they will pay in proportion to their carelessness under the comparative fault doctrine. 182 Moreover, it might
be worth noticing in this fairness calculus that the "careful" users
would not trade places with the "careless." If there is a subsidy, it is
more like the subsidy of those who toss liferopes to those who have
fallen into the sea than like the deliberate subsidy of an activity dangerous to others, such as the subsidy programs that have been provided by the United States government to tobacco farmers.
More importantly, the Restatement Reporters ignore much more
significant parallel fairness problems in a world without generic liability. In such a world, when manufacturers distribute products whose
injury costs are higher than their social utility, yet pay nothing for
those expected injuries when they occur, 183 the law subsidizes their
careless behavior. Completely innocent consumers, users, and bystanders injured by a dangerous product subsidize those who are not
injured, because the injury costs inherent in the product-that is, after
all, why its risks outweigh its utility-are not required to be included
in the product price, thanks to the injured having to pay their own
injury costs. Injured bystanders, who never even get the benefits of
the product, have to subsidize consumers and users. 84 The blatant
subsidization of the wrongdoers by the innocent, of the fortunate by
the unfortunate, and of product beneficiaries by those who gain nothing from the product but devastated lives seems to call out much more
loudly for a system of generic liability than the whispered unfairness
that might exist among consumers who use a product ten times a week
instead of only five. This seems somehow more deserving of commen181. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1312-13.
182. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (TauRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCrS LiAniLrr § 12, at 300-02 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).

183. Expected by the manufacturer, not by the consumer, user, or bystander.
184. Professors Henderson and Twerski recognize this subsidy aspect explicitly early in their
principal article, when they are making their cursory list of the benefits of broad products liability. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1275. However, they do not mention it again
when they are discussing the unfair subsidy which occurs when generic liability is imposed.
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careless betators' fairness condemnation than even consumer/user
85
oneself.'
to
harm
risks
havior, which inadvertently
Furthermore, when Professors Henderson and Twerski concentrate on the unfairness inherent in generic liability's forcing-as does
all product liability-injury costs to be borne by consumers on a perproduct, rather than per-use, basis, 186 they ignore the parallel unfairness which exists in first-party insurance. In the absence of generic
liability, injured persons will be thrown back on first-party insurance.
There, however, premiums depend not at all on patterns of product
consumption or use. The externalization of costs from those who buy
more dangerous products or behave more carelessly with products to
those who expose themselves to less risk is much more complete and
87
significant than is any similar "subsidy" pursuant to generic liability.'

1. Tort's Wretched Regressiveness
One area of unfairness which will emanate from the imposition of
generic liability, yet is not mentioned by the Restatement Reporters,
is its regressive effects. Like all tort law, generic liability helps the
well-off significantly more than it helps the poor. Everyone will pay
equally into the tort system per product. Everyone will get about the
same amount of safety-per-dollar-paid, but people with high wages
will get more insurance than those with low wages because tort judg88
ments replace income lost due to injury, whether it be high or low.'

I do not know, now, whether you girls will be economically poor
when you grow up. Even if you are, I doubt that this unfairness will
have any substantial significance for you. It seems unlikely to have
much wealth effect on your lives. Were it possible to calibrate generic
liability's insurance charge to the income of a product purchaser, the
189
change in product price would be fairly small.
185. I am sure you girls appreciate this moral difference, even if some legal commentators
seem not to. You sometimes feel foolish when you do something that is unsafe for yourself.
Your mom and I may scold you when you do such things, sometimes with a note of panic in our
voices and a fervently expressed wish that you be more careful. When you do something that
risks harm to others, you sometimes feel foolish and you sometimes feel you have done something bad. Your mom and I may scold you when you do those things, too. The tone of that
scolding more often is one of censure and we are more likely to fervently demand that you be
more careful.
186. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 3, at 1312-13.
187. For a fuller explanation of the operation of this first-party insurance externality, see
Croley & Hanson, supra note 13, at 785-86.
188. For additional description of regressiveness in the context of enterprise liability generally, see Geistfeld, supra note 47, at 1171.
189. Given the extremely small chance of injury attendant upon the sale of even quite dangerous products, the part of the purchase price of a particular product which reflects the cost of
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Besides, there are a couple of factors unique to generic liability
which actually may reduce the general regressiveness of tort law.
First, because liability suits against a particular producer will become
much simpler once the three-judge court has determined its product
qualifies for generic liability, more persons with relatively small economic loss-poorer people-will be able to find lawyers willing to
represent them on a contingency fee basis. More products liability
cases will be worth bringing when the costs of bringing such suits go
down. Second, insofar as the poor are less likely than their wealthier
covictims to have adequate first-party insurance, the insurance provided by the tort system will provide them with significant protection
while it provides the wealthier with little more than they already have.
Finally, less able to afford higher product prices, poorer people may
be more likely than the wealthy to execute the disclaimers, because
they will then be able to buy the product at a price that does not include the regressive tort "tax." In that sense, generic liability is less
regressive than the product liability system as a whole, where disclaimers are much less permitted. 19°
CONCLUSION

So, it seems, the damsel generic liability who looked so good at
the Bal did not turn out to be the Ugly Stepsister that her detractors
suggested. The glass slipper fits. It fits primarily because the doctrine
will deliver a substantial additional amount of safety to your lives.
That is what I am most concerned about for you, and for our Indonesian friends. It has to stand head and shoulders above other concerns
in importance in choosing a products liability rule. The rumors that
might tarnish generic liability's resplendent safety image fail to ring
true.
The cost? No injustice. But, you might end up losing access to
something you really like, at least until you are old enough to execute
one of those disclaimers. Or, you could end up paying a lot more for
some goods than you did before, for some wealth protection that you
could certainly get more cheaply elsewhere. Even then, the damage
liability insurance can be expected to be small. That part which reflects the difference in awards
to wealthier versus poorer persons will be much smaller, except at the extremes. With respect to
products which persons repeatedly purchase, such as cigarettes and ice cream, these small
amounts will add up over time. Even then, poorer people will probably just stop buying the
product before they feel any pinch from the unfair price difference. They then, at least, will be
safer than the wealthier consumers.
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (TrieD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LIABILxry § 13, at 310-11 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (disclaimers do not bar products liability claims for personal injuries).
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to your pocketbook, and, more importantly, your life satisfaction,
won't be much. A small amount for the safety you get out of the deal.
I finish this months after that opening bus ride, also at night, in
our lovely little Indonesian home. You are asleep. I have pretty well
convinced myself that your lives and other peoples' will be better if
the generic liability system I have talked so much about comes to be.
Cautious, however, for your sake, I am particularly happy that this
system has so many built-in devices to correct things if I turn out to be
wrong. That wouldn't happen any other way.
Sleep tight. Always.
Love,
Dad

